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Reports of Batson’s Death Have Been Greatly 
Exaggerated:1 How the Batson Doctrine Enforces a 
Normative Framework Of Legal Ethics
Laura I Appleman2
I. Introduction: Preserving Batson and  the Peremptory Challenge
Despite the peremptory challenge’s venerable common-law3
antecedents, there has lately been a movement in the criminal justice 
system to abolish this ancient workhorse. Jurists,4 practitioners and 
1 The phrase “Reports of my death have been greatly exaggerated,” attributable to 
Samuel Langhorn Clemens (Mark Twain), is a famous misquote. Clemens actually 
wrote “… the report of my death was an exaggeration,” in a May 1897 note to the
New York Journal. The Journal, which had conflated news of the illness of 
Clemens’s cousin, James Ross Clemens, into that of Clemens’s death, printed
Clemens’s correction on June 2, 1897. See http://www.the-right-
stuff.com/References/index.html#[NY%20Jnl%201897%20Twain%20Quotes [last 
visited 2/23/05]
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 Appellate Counsel, Center for Appellate Litigation, New York, NY.  B.A., M.A., 
University of Pennsylvania, J.D., Yale University.  I am grateful for my valuable 
discussions with and helpful comments of Michael B. Abramowicz, Drew S. Days 
III, Owen M. Fiss, David A. Friedman, Anthony T. Kronman, Jessie K. Liu, Darren 
Rosenblum, Kevin M. Stack and the participants in the NYU Law & Humanities 
Forum.
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   There is no constitutional right to the peremptory challenge.  Instead, it is “in the 
nature of a statutory privilege, which may be withheld altogether without impairing 
the constitutional guaranties of an ‘impartial jury’ and a fair trial.”  Frazier v. United 
States, 335 U.S. 497, 505 n.11 (1948).   States may grant the right to challenge 
jurors peremptorily at will, and take it away just as quickly.   See Stilson v. United 
States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (19__) (“there is nothing in the Constitution of the United 
States which requires the Congress [or the States] to grant peremptory challenges”). 
This is why the threats from various state courts and legislatures to eliminate the 
peremptory challenge must be taken seriously.  
4 See, e.g., Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A 
Trial Judge’s Perspective, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 836 (1997); People v. Tarkisha 
Brown, _ N.Y.2d __ (2002)(Kaye, J., concurring) (calling for elimination of 
peremptories); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (Marshall, J, concurring) 
(raising concern that Batson procedure may not eliminate discrimination and 
arguing for peremptory challenge abolishment); Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete 
Co., 500 U.S. 614, 645 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (objecting to extension of 
Batson to civil cases); Miller-El v. Cockrel, 537 U.S. 322 (2003) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting).  But see Christopher E. Smith & Roxanne Ochoa, The Peremptory 
Challenge in the Eyes of the Trial Judge, 79 JUDICATURE 185, 186 (January-
February 1996) (in survey of federal district court judges, majority viewed 
peremptory challenges as beneficial mechanism for attorney to remove potential 
jurors biased in favor of opposition). 
2legal scholars5 have begun to clamor for the outright prohibition of this 
jury selection tool, a movement that essentially began with the 
introduction of the Batson procedure a little over twenty years ago.6
Batson’s critics argue that the doctrine is in a state of disarray, and for 
many, their solution is to simply dispense with the entire exercise. 
The reasons for eliminating the peremptory challenge are varied. 
The combination of the Batson procedure and the peremptory 
challenge have been accused of causing multiple problems, including
confusing standards; injecting bias into the proceedings; permitting 
defense counsel’s unclean hands; inculcation of bias and unconscious 
racism into jury selection; waste of judicial time and money; and the
negative public perception of jury selection.   
5
 For a representative sampling of academic takes on the problems inherent in the 
Batson procedure and the peremptory challenge, see Albert W. Alschuler, The 
Supreme Court and the Jury:  Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of 
Jury Verdicts, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 153 (1989); Cheryl L. Bader, Batson Meets the 
First Amendment:  Prohibiting Peremptory Challenges That Violate a Prospective 
Juror’s Speech and Association Rights, 24 Hofstra L. Rev. 567, 583-86 (1996); 
Karen M. Bray, Comment, Reaching the Final Chapter in the Story of Peremptory 
Challenges, 40 UCLA L. REV. 517, 554-564 (1992);  Leonard L. Cavise, The 
Batson Doctrine:  The Supreme Court’s Utter Failure to Meet the Challenge of 
Discrimination in Jury Selection, 1999 Wis. L. Rev. 501 (1999); Comment, 
Fulfilling the Promise of Batson:  Protecting Jurors from the Use of Race-Based 
Peremptory Challenges by Defense Counsel, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1311 (1997); 
Andrew D. Leipold, Constitutionalizing Jury Selection in Criminal Cases:  A 
Critical Evaluation, 86 Geo. L.J. 945 (1998); Nancy S. Marder, Beyond Gender:  
Peremptory Challenges and the Roles of the Jury, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1041, 114-36 
(1995);  Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice:  What we have Learned about 
Batson and Peremptory Challenges, 71 Notre Dame L. Rev. 447, 502-03 (1996);  
Vivien T. Montz and Craig L. Montz, The Peremptory Challenge:  Should It Still 
Exist?  An Examination of Federal and Florida Law, 54 U. Miami L. Rev. 451 
(2000); William T. Pizzi, Batson v. Kentucky:  Curing the Disease but Killing the 
Patient, 1987 Sup. Ct. Rev. 97 (1987); Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race 
Discrimination in Jury Selection:  Whose Right Is It Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 
725, 760-64 (1992).  But see Cheryl Brown, Comment, Challenging the Challenge:  
Twelve Years after Batson, Courts are Still Struggling to Fill in the Gaps Left by 
The Supreme Court, 28 U. BALT. L. REV. 379 (1999) (concluding that Batson
challenge necessary tool to eliminate discrimination in jury selection despite “lack 
of direction”); Barbara L. Horowitz, The Extinction of the Peremptory Challenge:  
What Will the Jury System Lose by its Demise, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1391 (1993) 
(arguing that elimination of peremptory challenges will take away one of most 
important right guaranteed to litigant); A.C. Johnstone, Comment, 1998 U. Chi. 
Legal F. 441 (1998) (explaining pragmatic value of peremptory challenge while 
arguing that Batson should not be extended); Jean Montoya, What's So Magical 
About Black Women? Peremptory Challenges at the Intersection of Race and 
Gender, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 369 (1996) (arguing that Batson hearings on 
peremptory challenges do not consume considerable amount of court time, and 
providing critique of Batson standards).
6 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
3What the Batson critics overlook, however, is the positive power of 
the Batson doctrine. Using legal ethics as a lens through which to 
interpret Batson sheds new light on the doctrine.  Properly understood, 
the Batson procedure enforces a normative framework of legal ethics, 
providing an aspirational standard for the legal profession.  By 
fostering a non-discrimination norm as part of the norm of 
professionalization, Batson both improves the actions of lawyer and 
judges during jury selection while at the same time constructing and 
compelling an aspirational code of ethics. Batson’s ethical imperative 
affects the norms of the legal profession itself.  
Batson has a largely unarticulated ethical component, one that 
invokes a lawyer’s professional responsibility. By and through the 
Batson procedure, prosecutors, defense counsel and judges are 
compelled to act ethically in shaping the criminal jury. For trial 
counsel, this means trying to eliminate overtly illegal considerations of 
race and gender from jury selections and pointing out their opponents’ 
unconstitutional choices, as well as being ethical and honest when 
defending against a Batson claim.  For the bench, this means 
scrutinizing peremptory challenges carefully, occasionally bringing a 
sua sponte Batson challenge of their own, as well as applying 
considered and reasoned analysis in the three-step Batson process. 
Batson’s ethical component not only complicates our understanding of 
the professional behavior of the criminal bar, but also provides an 
aspirational standard for criminal lawyers and judges.
The Batson procedure also gives us a concrete example of how the
norms of the legal profession itself can be affected by laws.  
Traditionally, we think of laws being shaped by norms.7  With Batson, 
however, the law itself is affecting the legal profession’s non-
discrimination norms.  With the constant requirement to abide by the 
rules of Batson (that is, no challenges based on race or gender8), 
lawyers are compelled to focus on the norm of professionalism during 
jury selection, an important social norm. The desire to eliminate the 
7 See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, The Evolution of Social Norms:  A Perspective 
from the Legal Academy, in MICHAEL HECTER & KARL DIETER-OPPS, EDS, Social 
Norms (Russell Sage Foundation, 2001); ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT 
LAW:  HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991). For example, while it was once 
common to perform public floggings in the town square to punish blasphemy and 
adultery, we no longer do this because our norms of crime have changed.  Hence, 
our changing norms forced a change in the laws. See generally JURGEN 
HABERMAAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS:  CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE 
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (1996) (attempting to bridge internal and 
external perspectives through discourse theory). I discuss the effect of law and 
norms within the Batson procedure in greater detail infra Part I.
8 See JEB v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 143 (1994) (forbidding peremptory 
challenges based solely on gender).
4peremptory challenge and the Batson procedure disregards the power 
of the law to affect the social norms of lawyers.  Batson doctrine 
creates a space where law—here, the Batson procedure—is 
expressively influencing lawyers’ ethical behavior by the message it 
embodies.
Finally, a legal ethics approach to Batson provides the best means 
of understanding why the courts have adopted this specific doctrine to 
enforce the two critical rights of criminal jury selection:  the right of 
the defendant to a bias-free jury and the right of the potential juror to 
serve.  Instead of requiring that a wrongly excluded juror seek remedy 
in an extra-legal proceeding outside of the criminal trial, the Supreme 
Court demanded that criminal courts themselves actively participate in 
ensuring that jury selection is free from bias.  This decision makes 
most sense when legal ethics is viewed as a basis for a normative 
framework for establishing a means of enforcement for lawyers’ 
ethical obligations.  
Viewing the Batson doctrine through a legal ethics lens also helps 
clarify why the Supreme Court chose to enforce the norm of non-
discrimination through the trial court.  Given the tradition within legal 
ethics of imposing procedures and prophylactic rules to ensure that the 
legal profession meets its obligations, the Court decided that the best 
way to enforce ethical obligations was to remind lawyers of the 
profession’s ethical aspirations.  Accordingly, Batson functions as both 
a reminder of lawyers’ aspirational goals as well as a means of 
enforcement and attorney discipline.
This Article has several aims.  First, I will propose a legal ethics 
theory of Batson, as the Batson doctrine is a vehicle through which the 
legal system achieves a major aspiration of professionally responsible 
behavior. Second, I will provide a measured look at the anxiety 
surrounding the Batson procedure and the peremptory challenge, 
starting with its most recent history, and explain how my theory of 
legal ethics can resolve many of the Batson grievances. Finally, I will 
examine why Batson  is so important and look at some of the additional 
implications of my legal ethics approach.  
II.   A Legal Ethics Theory of Batson
The ethical deliberations compelled and enforced by Batson are 
critical in understanding Batson’s value. Batson has an unarticulated 
ethical component, one that invokes a lawyer’s professional 
responsibility and fosters a nondiscrimination norm as part of the norm 
of professionalism.  This is an area mostly unexplored by the 
professional responsibility literature,9 and one I will explore in greater 
detail.
9 One of the few treatments of ethics in Batson can be found in Sheri Lynn Johnson, 
Batson Ethics for Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 73 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW, 
5The field of legal ethics provides a useful lens for thinking
about Batson.  One aspect of Batson which is unique is that it protects 
the right of the potential jurors to serve on the jury, yet it is enforced in 
criminal justice proceedings by defense lawyers, prosecutors and 
judges.  A focus on legal ethics makes this aspect less anomalous, 
however, because Batson’s ethical imperative compels responsible 
behavior by attorneys and jurists on behalf of not only the defendant, 
but also the potential jurors.  The result is what one scholar has 
propounded as a moral theory of ethical lawyering; the lawyer or judge 
engaging with the Batson doctrine—which occurs in each and every 
jury selection—takes "personal moral responsibility for the 
consequences of their professional acts."10
The system of legal ethics is generally designed to protect the 
public and, in doing so, protect the integrity and reputation of the 
profession.  Traditionally, the standard enforcement mechanism for 
legal ethic complaints is the client-initiated attorney disciplinary 
proceedings.  Other types of enforcement mechanisms, however, often 
create a situation where the threat of the disciplinary proceeding is 
unlikely to provide a means of policing wrongdoing.  For example, we 
frequently rely on prosecutors and other lawyers to initiate charges 
against attorneys who assist their clients’ criminal activities.11
Traditional enforcement mechanisms, however, frequently fail to 
police attorney misconduct, as the punishment is so far attenuated 
SYMPOSIUM ON RACE AND CRIMINAL LAW 475 (1998) (articulating a broader vision 
of the Batson obligation and providing a concrete ethical standard for assessing 
when a strike violates that obligation).  Johnson, however, excludes defense counsel 
from her vision, and although she has recognized that Batson imposes ethical 
obligations on lawyers, she disagrees that legal ethics actually helps explain Batson
doctrine. Robin Charlow’s exploration of the ethicality of Batson focuses primarily 
on possible sanctions to be visited on attorneys who make discriminatory strikes.  
See Charlow, supra note __, at __.
10 DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION 17 (2000).  See also ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER :  
FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993) (discussing the ideal of the 
lawyer-statesman, which Kronman maintains is dying a slow death in the American 
legal profession).  Although I agree with Kronman that the lawyer-statesman ideal 
is in decline, I do not agree with his proposition that the ideals that have risen to 
replace it are “anemic.”  Id. at 3.  On the contrary, I contend that Batson is one 
example that illustrates the sense of honor and duty that most attorneys and judges 
possess, particularly in the arena of criminal justice, that most maligned of practice 
areas.  As I discuss below, Batson doctrine, although imperfect, gives lawyers an 
aspirational ideal that is achievable in the realities of daily practice.  Although not 
so weighty a concept as the lawyer-statesman ideal, Batson promotes legal ethics in 
one of the most fraught areas of justice, the criminal trial.
11
 A recent example of this is the prosecution and conviction of New York defense 
attorney Lynne Stewart for facilitating the expression of terrorist messages from her 
client, Omar Abdel Rahman.
6from the actual misdeed that there is little reinforcement of positive 
behavior.
The Batson procedure is a special type of enforcement 
mechanism, one which differs from the rest by accurately and 
immediately policing wrongdoing. Batson should thus be seen as one 
way in which the legal system achieves one of its aspirations, because 
the ethical behavior of participants in the criminal trial is ensured by 
the rules of the doctrine. As one scholar notes, “the likelihood that the 
traits of character on which ethical lawyering depends will be fostered 
or undermined among individual lawyers will be determined to a great 
extent by the shape of the institutional framework of legal practice.”12
The framework of Batson fosters ethical lawyering by its immediate 
and vigorous enforcement mechanisms.
By and through the Batson procedure, prosecutors, defense 
counsel13 and judges are compelled to act ethically in shaping the 
criminal jury.14 For counsel, this means trying to eliminate overtly 
illegal considerations of race and gender from their jury selections and 
pointing out their opponents’ unconstitutional choices, as well as being 
ethical and honest when undergoing a Batson challenge to their 
peremptory challenge of a potential juror.  For the bench, this means 
scrutinizing peremptory challenges carefully, occasionally bringing a 
sua sponte Batson challenge of their own, as well as considered and 
reasoned analysis in the three-step Batson process.15
12
 Sharon Dolovich, Ethical Lawyering and the Possibility of Integrity, 70 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1629, 1630 (2002).  
13 For a variety of reasons, criminal defense lawyers have been scrutinized more 
vigorously than other attorneys in regards to legal ethics.  For more extensive 
arguments regarding the special position of criminal defense lawyers, see David 
Luban, Are Criminal Defense Lawyers Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729 (1993); 
William H. Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1703 (1993); 
William H. Simon, Reply: Further Reflections on Libertarian Criminal Defense, 91 
MICH. L. REV. 1767 (1993).
14
 As will become evident, I disagree with such legal scholars who argue that 
lawyers are becoming more dishonest as time goes on.  For a representative sample 
of this view, see W. William Hodes, Truthfulness and Honesty Among American 
Lawyers: Perception, Reality, and the Professional Reform Initiative, 53 S.C. L. 
REV. 527 (2002)(suggesting that decline in lawyer honesty is main reason for 
decline in the public's perception of lawyers).
15
 The state action invoked by the Batson procedure brings up the issue of “the 
appearance of impropriety and the expressive component of state action,” as 
explored recently by Deborah Hellman in Judging By Appearances:  Professional 
Ethics, Expressive Government and the Morality of How Things Seem, 60 MD. L. 
REV. 653, __ (2001) (arguing that the appearance of impropriety can inform the 
discussion on the expressive dimension of state action).   As discussed above, 
Batson is so important—and so scrutinized—because it involves the public’s right 
7Batson’s ethical component not only complicates our 
understanding of the professional behavior of criminal lawyers, but 
also provides an aspirational standard16 for criminal lawyers and 
judges.  By asserting that defense counsel have unclean hands, or that 
both prosecutors and defense wish to misuse peremptories to 
manipulate voir dire, as some of the Batson critics do, is to 
underestimate the professional behavior of not only criminal lawyers 
and their adversaries, but also the criminal bench.   Batson’s role in 
uncovering pretext, in the beginning of the criminal jury trial, creates a 
level of ethicality which sets the tone for the rest of the judicial 
proceeding.
The idea that lawyers play a role as public guardian is 
definitely one in retreat.17  Some scholars, however, have suggested 
that lawyers’ commitment to the public good is an aspiration worth 
reviving.18  This is where Batson may provide a useful example.  By 
providing an open forum in which all three actors in the criminal 
justice system are not only required but also encouraged to watch for 
bias and prejudice, their own19 and others’, Batson can play a small 
to serve on a jury, and all peremptory challenges are enacted by the state.  
Impermissibly striking potential jurors on the basis of race or gender causes two 
potential harms to merge:  in expressive state action, the mimetic (appearing to do 
wrong) and non-mimetic (actually doing wrong) combine, as “appearance and 
reality coalesce.”  Hellman, Judging Appearances, at __.  In Hellman’s phrasing, 
how the action of impermissibly striking jurors due to race or gender appears 
(biased) and how it actually is (biased) are the same.
16
 By promoting this aspiration standard, I do not mean to contradict Fred 
Zacharias’s keen observation about “the fiction that lawyers somehow are, or can be 
regulated into being, more upstanding than laypersons.”  Fred Zacharias, The 
Humanization of Lawyers, Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series 5  
(2003).  Instead, I look to a more realistic aspirational standard, one that promotes 
not so much a “higher standard of citizenship” as a standard of basic ethical 
behavior that I would hope all people would strive for, not just lawyers.
17 See Russell Pearce, Lawyers as America’s Governing Class:  The Formation and 
Dissolution of the Original Understanding of the American Lawyer’s Role, 8 U. 
CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 381, 417-19 (2001).
18 See Russell Pearce, Retreat of the Elite, Am. Law, July 2001, at 79.  Pearce 
observes, however, that efforts at promoting this kind of commitment have failed so 
far, because law is still a business.  Id.   For a view of how aspirational legal ethics 
can function in the business law world, see Howard M. Erichson, Doing Well by 
Doing Good, 57 VAND. L. REV __ (2004).
19
 Of course, one specific concern defense counsel has which the prosecutor and the 
judge do not is the question of client loyalty.  As Erichson observes, while the 
theme of commitment to the public good pervades discussions of lawyer 
professionalism, views differ substantially on the extent to which lawyers should 
focus on the public good versus loyal and zealous representation of their clients.  
See Erichson, supra note __, at 23 n.117.  For example, compare Monroe 
Freedman, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS (1990) (arguing for an advocacy 
8role in reviving the conception of lawyers as public guardians.20  By 
judicious use of Batson, the original sense of “pro bono publico”—the 
broad concept of what was within the public interest—could be 
restored as well, instead of limiting it to the definition it currently has 
of undercompensated legal representation.21  In the spirit of Roscoe 
Pound, Batson could link professional conduct with serving the public 
interest—“it is of the essence of a profession that it is practiced in a 
spirit of public interest.”22  As well, careful and proper use of Batson
could provide the moral accountability that professional responsibility 
scholars desire to instill into the profession at large.23
Batson, too, relies on a shared trust between the prosecutor, 
defense counsel and judge.  Although each and any one of these 
players may start the Batson ritual by raising the challenge, in the end 
the others can only rely on the challenged attorney’s word whether he 
has a genuine race-neutral reason for striking the potential juror.  Once 
the Batson challenge has been raised, if the race-neutral reasoning is 
found suspect, then the other two actors in the criminal trial are bound 
to be more suspicious of the challenged attorney, since the trust has 
been broken.  Maintaining this level of trust provides another way in 
perspective);  Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend:  The Moral Foundations of the 
Lawyer- Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976) (same) with David Luban, 
LAWYERS AND JUSTICE:  AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988) (arguing for a perspective of 
moral activism);  William Simon, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE (1998) (arguing for a 
competing vision focusing on legal merit and justice as opposed to subjective 
morality).
20
 One area in which it can be argued that the role of the lawyer as public guardian 
still remains is in “cause lawyering.”  Menkel-Meadows defines cause lawyering as 
“an activity that seeks to use law-related means or seeks to change laws or 
regulations to achieve greater social justice,” for both particular individuals and 
disadvantaged groups.  See Menkel-Meadow, The Causes of Cause Lawyering:  
Toward an Understanding of the Motivation and Commitment of Social Justice 
Lawyers, in Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, eds., CAUSE LAWYERING:  POLITICAL 
COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 38 (1998).  Many, if not all, 
criminal defense attorneys, particularly those who represent the indigent, see their 
role as counsel as a means of cause lawyering.  
21 See Erichson, supra note __, at 18. As Erichson points out, “the profession’s 
modern usage of the phrase ‘pro bono publico’ includes representation without fee 
as well as some instances of representation for a substantially reduced fee.”  See id., 
supra note __, at 18 n.87.   Erichson argues, correctly in my view, that the 
“prevailing conception of public interest work is based on considered to be public 
interest work is based on an implicit determination of market undervaluation,” but 
this does not have to be the case.  See id. See also Judith L. Maute, Changing 
Conceptions of Lawyers’ Pro Bono Responsibilities:  From Chance Noblesse 
Oblige to State Expectations, 77 TUL. L. REV. 91, 113 (2002).
22
 Roscoe Pound, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 9 (1953).
23 See, e.g., Deborah Rhode, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, REFORMING THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION (2000).
9which Batson positively influences legal ethics.  Moreover, it helps 
illustrate how the norms of professional responsibility are affected by 
legal sources.   
But Batson’s ethical component is even broader.  As one legal 
ethics scholar has observed:
How lawyers reconcile the tension between moral 
aspirations and pragmatic constraints is important not 
just for the profession but also for the nation.  Lawyers 
play a crucial role in the structure of our private affairs 
and public institutions. . . . A central challenge of legal 
practice is how to live a life of integrity in the tension 
between these competing demands.24
Batson’s requirement that lawyers and judges behave ethically has 
spillover effects onto the larger world of criminal justice.25  The 
criminal defendant, knowing her lawyer cannot illegally strike 
potential jurors based on race, ethnicity or gender, is touched by the 
egalitarian principles embedded in the procedure.  The prosecutor 
representing the state or the nation knows his actions, if illegal or 
underhanded, will reflect negatively on the polity.  The judge has her 
own responsibility to independently scrutinize each side’s peremptory 
challenges and isolate any that even smack of improper reasoning.  
The Batson ritual, enacted over and over again in the criminal 
courtroom, promotes ethical behavior not just in the selection of the 
criminal jury but also the larger world because the integrity and 
fairness practiced there promotes social justice.26  Social justice begets
more social justice.
Additionally, Batson provides a respite from the common 
problems of adversarial justice.  The “corruption of judgment”27 that 
24
 Deborah Rhode, Introduction, ETHICS IN PRACTICE __ (Oxford Univ. Press 2000).
25
 The Batson procedure also provides a corrective for some of the critique of 
professional responsibility as it is currently taught to lawyers and law students--the 
legalistic model.  As Baron and Greenstein note, “law students learn to think of law 
generally, and Professional Responsibility specifically, as disengaged from moral 
considerations.” Constructing the Field of Professional Responsibility, 15 NOTRE 
DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY __ (2001). Batson is a 
counterpoint to this problem because it is a legal problem directly engaged with the 
moral considerations of ethical behavior, racial equality and honest practice.
26
 As Rhode argues, “The public deserves reasonable access to legal assistance and 
legal processes that satisfy minimum standards of fairness, effectiveness and 
integrity.  And the profession deserves conditions of practice that reinforce such 
standards in the service of social justice.”  Rhode, supra note __, at __.
27
 David Luban, Wrongful Obedience:  Bad Judgments and Warranted Excuses, 
ETHICS IN PRACTICE _ (OUP 2000).
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often results from the adversarial system28 is less likely to occur in 
criminal jury selection due to Batson; because there is a ritualized, 
easily invoked correction to the manipulation of voir dire for unethical 
or illegal reasons by three separate actors (judge, prosecutor and 
defense counsel), professionally responsible behavior is that much 
more likely to occur.  Batson is a tool of self-regulation29 that works, 
because the attempts to strike potential jurors for illegal motives is 
more often than not caught and punished.   Unlike many areas of the 
law, which have little to no disciplinary proceedings except for the 
most egregious of cases, justice for the Batson violation is swift, 
reliable and fitting the crime. 
The “evolving ideal”30 of professional responsibility should 
expand to absorb the role of Batson procedure in criminal law.  
Although admittedly imperfect, Batson provides both a path and a 
floor to the lawyers involved in the arena of criminal justice.  Batson’s 
built-in self regulation permits each party involved in the criminal 
case—defense counsel, defendant, prosecutor and judge—to act as 
ethically as possible as well as to examine their own conscience if 
called to account for their jury strikes.31  In sum, Batson narrows the 
divide between “ethical aspirations and daily practices”32 which should 
always be the goal of the ethical lawyer.      
Examined closely, the Batson doctrine espouses a theory of 
legal ethics that urges counsel to behave in a professionally 
28
 As Robert Gordon has documented, the legal system is a common good that 
cannot function effectively in the face of unrestrained partnership.  See Robert 
Gordon, Why Lawyers Can’t Just Be Hired Guns, ETHICS IN PRACTICE (Oxford U. 
P. 2000)
29
  Of course, as Zacharias, among others, has observed, “professional regulation 
has followed a trend of becoming ‘legalized’—more specific and designed for 
enforcement.”  Zacharias, Humanization, supra note __, at 15.  See also Frank O. 
Bowman, A Bludgeon By Any Other Name:  The Misuse of ‘Ethical Rules’ Against 
Prosecutors To Control The Law of The State, 9 GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 665, 762 
(1996) (describing “an increasing ‘legalization’ of  attorney discipline”);  Geoffrey 
C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1241 (1991) 
(nothing that traditional professional “norms have become ‘legalized’”).
30
 Rhode, supra note __, at __.
31
 Unlike many other ethics rules, Batson’s enforcement mechanisms ensure prompt 
following of its ethical dictates.  Cf. Roger C. Cramton, Furthering Justice by 
Improving the Adversary System and Making Lawyers More Accountable, 70 
Fordham L. Rev. 1599 (2002) (arguing that  rules of ethics are so minimal and 
ambiguous that they do not promote justice, concluding that legislatures and courts 
should create standards that clearly define prohibited conduct, including 
punishments of civil liability and sanctions).
32
 Rhode, supra note __, at __.
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responsible way and elucidates ethical means of behavior for both 
attorneys and judges. The text of Batson itself indicates that the 
Supreme Court has seen Batson as representing an ethical imperative, 
emphasizing the unique role and responsibility of lawyers.  
A.  The Ethical Imperative of Batson v. Kentucky
A close reading of Batson v. Kentucky illustrates the ethical 
imperative propounded by the Supreme Court in its creation of Batson
doctrine. Batson can be summarized as a three-part process to 
examine whether the disputed peremptory challenge was rooted in bias 
or discriminatory thinking. Step one requires defense counsel to make 
a prima facie case that the challenges in the case at hand were racially 
motivated and that the juror is a member of a “cognizable racial 
group.”33  In step two, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a 
race-neutral reason for the challenges.34  Finally, if a race-neutral 
reason is provided, in step three the trial court determines whether the 
challenger has met her burden of proving that the potential jurors had 
been struck due to racial prejudice.35  The Court has recognized that 
each state remained free to develop its own practices regarding the 
manner in which its trial courts should handle Batson claims.36
The Batson opinion begins by reaffirming that a state’s 
purposeful or deliberate denial of participation to blacks as jurors in 
the administration of justice violates the Equal Protection Clause,37
thus reminding all readers that the ethical practice of lawyering was at 
stake.  Expounding on this principle, the Court goes on to specify that 
a defendant has a right to be tried by a jury whose members are 
selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria,38 explicitly noting that 
the “Equal Protection Clause guarantees the defendant that the State 
will not exclude members of his race from the jury venire on account 
33
 Batson, id. at 82.  The challenger must show that (1) the group is definable and 
limited by some clearly identifiable factor; (2) a common thread of attitudes, ideas 
or experiences runs through the group; and (2) a community of interest exists 
among the group’s members, such that the group’s interest cannot be adequately 
represented if the group is excluded from the jury selection process.  See United 
States v. Svrgo, 815 F.2d 30,33 (1st Cir. 1987).
34
 See Batson at 97.  Although the prosecutor’s explanation need not rise to the 
same level of justification as a for-cause challenge, it cannot be pretextual.  See id.  
35 See id.
36 See id. at 99.
37 Batson, 476 U.S. at 84. 
38 Batson, id. at 85-86. 
12
of race, or on the false assumption that members of his race as a group 
are no qualified to serve as jurors.”39 Such strong language at the 
beginning of the opinion serves to set up the prosecutor’s ethical 
requirement to act honorably and honestly in her use of peremptory 
challenges to create a fair jury.
The Court goes on to explain how the harm from 
discriminatory jury selection extends from harm to the defendant to the 
excluded juror and, ultimately, to the entire community.40 By 
expanding the realm of injury caused by biased peremptory challenges, 
the Court makes clear that the duty of the prosecutor, to behave 
ethically in jury selection, is essential not only to ensure a fair trial for 
one person, but also to sustain the underlying ethos of responsible 
legal behavior.  To fail to do so is to injure three separate parties: the 
defendant, the excluded juror, and, most importantly for our purposes, 
the community at large.  The Court thus provides a basis for why the 
non-discrimination norm fostered by Batson helps create a pervading 
sense of ethical behavior for everyone involved.
The Batson Court also discusses why it chose to have the 
requirement for ethical behavior in criminal jury selection enforced by 
judges.  By stating that the “Constitution requires . . . we look beyond 
the face of the statute defining juror qualifications and also consider 
challenged selection practices to afford ‘protection against action of 
the State through its administrative officers in effecting the prohibited 
discrimination,’”41 the Court directly addresses why judges are the 
most effective way to enforce Batson’s ethical requirements.    
Because judges, in accepting counsel’s peremptory challenges, 
implement any bias through the hands of the State, it only makes sense 
to have this very same hand of the State reject impermissible 
challenges.  
Unlike so many instances of attorney misconduct, Batson
allows the State a direct role in enforcing ethical conduct (through the 
role of the judge in evaluating a Batson challenge) and in disciplining 
the erring attorney (by refusing her peremptory challenge due to a 
finding of bias).  Hence the Court’s decision to give trial courts the 
disciplinary tools for correcting ethical violations in jury selection 
makes sense.  As the Batson court argues, “[w]e have confidence that 
trial judges, experience in supervising voir dire, will be able to decide 
if the circumstances concerning the prosecutor’s use of peremptory 
challenges creates a prima facie case of discrimination against black 
jurors.”42
39 Batson, id. at 86.
40 Batson, id. at 87.
41 Batson, id. at 88.
42 Batson, id. at 97.
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In setting out the three-step procedure of Batson doctrine, the 
Court specifies its ethical requirements for trial courts and prosecutors.  
First, in determining if the defendant carried her burden of persuasion, 
the trial court must undertake “a sensitive inquiry into such 
circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available.”43
That is to say, the trial court must ethically use its knowledge of 
motivation to sift through the prosecutor’s intent, to see if the 
prosecutor has behaved ethically in the first instance.
Next, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to ethically explain the 
exclusion of the potential juror.  The Court pointedly remarks, in its 
discussion of step two, that the “State cannot meet its burden on mere 
general assertions that its officials did not discriminate or that they 
properly performed their official duties.”44  This warning to 
prosecutors also functions as a sign of the heightened ethical standards 
that the Court has chosen to impose in overruling prior law and 
implementing Batson.  By stating the requirement that the prosecutor 
must give “a clear and reasonably specific explanation of his 
legitimate reasons”45 so starkly and repeatedly, the Court signals that
the ethical behavior of the prosecutor is paramount to the proper 
functioning of the Batson doctrine.
Interestingly, the Court is most explicit in addressing its ethical 
requirements for judges and prosecutors in a footnote directed to 
Justice Marshall46 at the end of the opinion.47  Noting that it does not 
share Marshall’s concerns regarding prosecutorial and judicial 
enforcement, the Court rejects the notion that prosecutors will not 
fulfill their duty to exercise only legitimate challenges.48  Instead, it 
assumes and compels their responsible behavior, along with that of the 
bench, by articulating a specific ethical responsibility:  “Nor do we 
think that this historic trial practice, which long has served the 
selection of an impartial jury, should be abolished because of an 
apprehension that prosecutors and trial judges will not perform 
conscientiously their respective duties under the Constitution.”49  By 
singling out the conscientious duties of the bar and the bench, the 
43 Batson, id. at 93.
44 Batson, id. at 94.
45 Batson, id. at 98 (quotations and citations omitted).
46
 I discuss Justice Marshall’s Batson concurrence supra Part II.
47 Batson, id. at 99 n.22.
48 Batson, id. at 99 n.22.
49 Batson, id. at 99 n.22.
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Court made clear the unique role and responsibility of lawyers to 
behave appropriately in criminal jury selection.
Ultimately, by so explicitly articulating the behavioral 
standards for both the judge and the prosecutor, the Batson Court lays 
down both an ethical imperative and an aspirational goal for the 
profession. As the Court states in its conclusion, “[i]n view of the 
heterogeneous population of our Nation, public respect for our 
criminal justice system and the rule of law will be strengthened if we 
ensure that no citizen is disqualified from jury service because of his 
race.”50
The Court makes clear that the Batson apparatus is designed to 
protect the defendant, the potential juror and the public, the same 
constituency with which legal ethics is deeply concerned.  The ethical 
imperative expressed by the Batson Court is one way the law achieves 
one of its aspirations, reinforcing the public trust that is inherent in the 
model of legal ethics.
B. Batson’s positive effect on the norms of the legal profession
Unlike neoclassical law and economics, legal ethics is based on 
the view that the legal profession has norms and that lawyers will 
generally seek to comply with these norms.  Legal ethics does not 
naively avoid enforcing the obligations that it imposes, but rather than 
seeking some type of optimal penalty structure, it works by reminding 
lawyers of the profession’s ethical aspirations, and, in extreme cases, 
disciplining lawyers who have flouted the rules.  In short, legal ethics 
provides an alternative framework to neoclassical law and economics 
in providing a means of enforcing obligations.
Batson influences behavior expressively through the message it 
embodies, positively influencing the norms of the legal profession.
Admittedly, fostering good social norms among the population at large 
cannot be a sufficient justification for Batson.  Batson is too low 
salience of an issue to have very much of an effect of social norm writ 
large, because the actual procedure is not utilized that frequently
within criminal trials.51 Batson’s power to foster a non-discrimination 
norm as part of the norms of professionalism, however, provides a 
sound justification.  The movement to eliminate the peremptory 
50 Batson, id. at 99 (emphasis mine).
51 Anecdotally, I have been told that many criminal practitioners refer to Batson as 
“the A-bomb” and are hesitant to invoke it, in part because opposing counsel view it 
as an accusation of racism.
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challenge and the Batson procedure disregards its power to affect the 
norms52 of the legal profession.  
Batson gives us a fascinating, concrete example of how ethical 
norms can be affected by laws. Traditionally, we think of norms 
shaping laws,53 as legal regulation often functions to particularize the 
broader behavioral standards embodied in social norms.54 Norms 
impact the actual rules of operation in society in at least two distinct 
ways.55   First, people’s conduct and behavior are influenced by 
established norms in a society.56  Second, “norms can motivate law 
and have a substantial influence on what gets codified as law.”57
52
 As Lynn Stout observes, there is some disagreement among legal scholars who 
write upon the topic of social norms as to an exact definition of what social norms 
are.  However, “there seems to be a general consensus . . . that norms are rules of 
behavior that are enforced primarily not by courts, but by other forces.”  Lynn A. 
Stout, Other-Regarding Preferences and Social Norms, Georgetown Law and 
Economics Research Paper No. 265902 (March 2001) (arguing that the human 
tendency to act in an other-regarding fashion (to sacrifice in order to help or harm 
others) is far more pervasive, powerful, and important than generally recognized).
53 See, e.g., Amartya Sen, Normative Evaluations and Legal Analogues, keynote 
lecture at conference on Norms and the Law, Wash. U. School of Law, March 2001) 
(transcript on file with author) (“norms and laws are intimately connected and 
influence each other. The influences work in both directions.”)  See generally
Robert C. Ellickson, The Evolution of Social Norms: A Perspective from the Legal 
Academy, in SOCIAL NORMS (Michael Hechter & Karl-Dieter Opp, eds., March 
2001); (reviewing literature); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and 
Regulation of Social Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 343-46 (1997) (same);  
Symposium, Law, Economics, and Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643 (1996); 
Symposium, The Legal Construction of Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577 (2002); 
Symposium, Social Norms, Social Meaning, and the Economic Analysis of Law, 27 
J. LEGAL STUD. 537 (1998).  See also ERIC POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS
(2000) (discussing laws, norms and economic methodology).
54 See McAdams, supra note __, at  340-50.
55 See Sen, supra note __, at 1.
56 See Sen, supra note __, at 1.  Sen goes on to explain:
Norms can impose obligations and constraints which work 
like law, and this is perhaps the most direct manifestation of 
norms as “unwritten law” to which Charles Davenant referred.  
At the very least, norms can supplement legal rules (the 
“written law,” as it were) that are in force. . . . Norms and their 
operation cannot altogether supplant legal rules and their 
enforcement, but they can certainly supplement the latter 
effectively, which is the point at issue here.
See id.
57
 Sen, supra note __, at 1.  Sen points out that this can either work directly through 
legislation or more indirectly through judicial interpretation.  See id.  
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Frameworks of law and legal thinking have also influenced the 
discussion and formulation of norms, however.58 The laws embodied 
in Batson and progeny themselves affects norms.59 The influence goes 
both ways—not only do norms influence laws, but law and legal 
thinking also shape norms and normative thinking.  Specifically, law 
and legal thinking have a great influence on ethical norms, as legal 
concepts “can thus help to clarify what is to be morally sought as well 
as to communicate the results of ethical deliberations.” 60
Batson is such an example.  From the time of the Civil Rights 
movement and the codifications of those rights into the Civil Rights 
Act, society slowly had begun to move towards a more expansive 
theory of rights for minorities and women. There was a significant lag 
in the actualization of such rights, however.  This was true in both 
general society and in the criminal justice system.   By the mid-1980’s, 
the laws that had created the expanding norms of equality in everyday 
life had not, for various reasons,61 reached the criminal courtroom.  
Thus, the creation of the Batson procedure62 in 1986 responded to 
these ethical deliberations, and the doctrine has grown as our 
understanding of what is to be “morally sought” has expanded 
accordingly.  
Approximately 20 years later, the legal concept crystallized by 
Batson—that blacks, and later women and other minorities, cannot be 
stricken from the jury due to their immutable characteristics—has
helped clarify what is to be “morally sought:”63  the fair selection of a 
58 See Sen, supra note __, at 2.  As Sen notes, since these connections from law to 
norms have received less attention than the connections of norms to law, they need 
“more explicit examination.”  Id.
59 See Sen, supra note ___, at 3 (discussing “the way frameworks of law and legal 
thinking influence the discussion and formulation of norms.”)
60 Sen, supra  note __, at 4.
61
 Such as Jim Crow laws, the slowness of society to change, etc.  
62
 The fact that these racial and gender norms have evolved so rapidly in the past 
thirty years, in part via their inculcation in the law, can be attributed to their status 
as other-regarding norms.  As Stout argues, “other-regarding behaviors are 
especially likely to be socially ‘codified’ into norms, and especially likely to prove 
sticky, because human beings are predisposed to adopt other-regarding preference 
functions.”  Stout, supra note __, at __.   Requiring egalitarian treatment for blacks, 
women and ethnic minorities encapsulate the more general norm of “treating others 
as you would like to be treated.”   The fact these Batson norms have arisen also 
argue for their efficiency.  As Ellickson has documented, norms tend to support 
efficient behaviors because people have an innate preference for utilitarian, or 
welfare-improving, norms.  See Ellickson, supra note __, at 29; Stout, supra note 
__, at __.
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criminal jury, untainted by bias, heuristics, or contemporary anxieties 
over race and gender.  The difficulty of this goal was indeed made 
easier by establishing its “legal analogue.”  In short, without Batson, it 
is reasonable to assume that biased juries might still have been 
empanelled for at least another decade, if not, with more subtlety, 
through today.64
Moreover, a legal enactment like Batson can also help 
publicize a new consensus about desirable behavior.65  Although by 
1986 there was, in the broadest sense, a general consensus that 
discrimination on the basis of race was unconstitutional and improper, 
the holding of this theoretical norm had not quite percolated down to 
the specific reality of criminal jury selection.  Similarly, in 1992, 
although the gender norm of egalitarian, non-discriminatory treatment 
had begun to take hold in general society, it had not permeated the 
strongholds of the criminal courtroom.  The principles of Batson as a 
legal norm have helped confirm, inculcate and publicize the 
requirements of the most modern racial and gender norms for lawyers.  
This process continues today.  The discussion, in the courts and 
in the legal academy, about the permissibility of challenging jurors on 
basis of national origin and religion illustrates the questionable status 
both of these classifications have achieved in the national discourse.   
The lack of a legal norm crystallizing these classifications as either 
permissible or impermissible not only shows the confusion and lack of 
clarity that these labels currently evoke in society, it also demonstrates 
the need for law to help create the social norms themselves.  Batson
and progeny are a fine example of the two-way street of influence 
from legal norms to social norms and back again.
Recent law and economic work also appreciates the 
significance of norms, as the economics literature now uses norms to 
explain an incredible variety of positive and normative issues.66 As 
63
 In this sense, I am endorsing a “naturalist” theory of the law, as opposed to either 
a positivist or historicist theory.  See, e.g., Harold J. Berman, The Historical 
Foundations of Law, Emory University School of Law Public Law and Legal 
Theory Research Paper Series, No. 05-3, at 3 (defining naturalist theory of law as 
one focused on law as a moral instrument, in contrast to positivist or historicist 
theories).
64
 For a view arguing that criminal law in general should track social norms to be 
effective, see PAUL ROBINSON & JOHN DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY AND BLAME: 
COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (Westview 1995) (suggesting that 
there is a tension between the legal code in America and folk intuitions concerning 
criminal culpability and the proportionality of punishment).
65
 Richard McAdams, The Origin, Development and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. 
L. REV. 338, 350-51 (1997).
66
 See McAdams, Regulation of Norms, supra note __, at 340.  For a representative 
discussion of norms in the field of law and economics, see, for example, Robert 
Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEG. STUDIES 585 (1998); ROBERT 
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one scholar notes, “many legal rules are best understood as efforts to 
harness the independent regulatory power of social norms.”67
When, as here, law influences an equilibrium, there are both 
behavioral and hermeneutic effects.68  Behaviorally, the Batson
doctrine has encouraged lawyers to act in an ethical manner during 
jury selection, and decreased their use of bias, consciously and 
subconsciously, in using peremptory challenge. Hermeneutically, 
Batson has helped change beliefs that lawyers possess by imposing 
such immediate and shaming consequences to improper and 
unconstitutional peremptory challenges. Accordingly, law influences 
behavior by changing the norms that determine the meaning ascribed 
to behavior.69
Moreover, Batson has influenced and reinforced ethical norms 
through its expressive function.70 According to the expressive theory 
of law, “the expression of social values is an important function of the 
courts, or possibly the most important function of the courts.”71 Norms 
can explain the expressive function of law: by "making a statement," 
law can strengthen the norms it embodies and weaken those it 
condemns.72 Batson doctrine provides an instrument for changing 
social norms by extrinsically expressing commitments to ethical 
behavior and non-discriminatory actions.73
Finally, Batson both compels and helps communicate ethical 
deliberations over what it means to empanel a “proper” criminal jury. 
“Law can speak loud and clear, and moral reasoning may have use for 
that legal voice.”74 Here, the moral reasoning that required equal 
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991); Richard H. McAdams, Signaling 
Discount Rates: Law, Norms, And Economic Methodology, 110 YALE L.J. 625 
(2001); ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 1-7 (2000).  As McAdam notes, 
“More recently, the subject of social norms has come to the sustained attention of 
rational choice scholars, including economists, philosophers, political scientists, and 
legal theorists.”  McAdams, Signaling Discount Rates, at 625-26.
67
 Posner, supra note __, at 7.
68
 Posner, supra note __, at 33.
69 See Larry Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 
968-72, 1019-25 (1995).
70
 For a general exploration how law influences norms through its expressive 
function, see Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, at 585-6 (equating creation of 
norms by court to expression of social values);  
71
 Cooter, supra note __, at 585.
72 See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2021, 2034-35 (1996).
73 See Cooter, supra note __, at 611.
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rights for all citizens was articulated by Batson and its progeny, and 
the criminal justice system quite obviously needed its legal and moral 
directive.75 Batson’s requirement to protect the criminal defendant, 
the prospective juror and the public’s participation in the jury and 
foster anti-discriminatory actions helps preserve the moral rights so 
necessary for a proper functioning of legal ethics.  
C.  Enforcing Batson Norms through Jury Selection
Batson norms are primarily enforced through jury selection.  One
way that Batson differs, in terms of legal ethics, from most other 
constitutional rules is how it is enforced in the proceedings of the 
actual trial; even when a Batson decision is overturned on the appellate 
level, the remedy is invariably sent back to the trial court for 
scrutinization of the challenged strike.  That is to say, unlike most 
attorney violations of legal ethics, the Batson doctrine requires the 
process of jury selection to be the locus for the enforcement of the 
Batson norm instead of attorney disciplinary proceedings.
Though the Constitution provides the source of the right to have a 
jury free from discrimination and bias, legal ethics provides the best 
means of understanding the approach to enforcing the right that the 
courts have adopted.  As most recently elucidated by Mitchell Berman, 
there is an important distinction between constitutional meaning and 
the means by which that meaning is enforced.76 The conflict between 
constitutional meaning vs. constitutional doctrine is too great a subject 
to discuss here, and I limit my discussion to the specifics of Batson.
When it comes to implementing the constitutional meaning of 
Batson, viewing the procedure through the lens of legal ethics gets us 
74
 Sen, supra note __, at 4.
75
 Sen goes on to point out, however, that “it is not in general cogent even to 
presume that if a normative right is important, then it must necessarily be 
appropriate to try to legislate and institutionalize it as a legal right.”  Sen, supra note 
__, at 7.  In the case of Batson, one can presume that the impetus of the Civil Rights 
and feminist movement spurred the creation of the law and its progeny.  I do not 
mean to suggest, however, that moral rights will always find their champion in legal 
ones; quite the opposite.  “In many cases the influence of legal analogy and legal 
thinking has been to narrow the breadth and range of ethical and political 
reasoning.”  Id. at 16.    
76 See generally Mitchell Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules,  90 VIRGINIA LAW 
REVIEW 1, 35-50 (2004).  As Berman observes, “American constitutional theorists 
and judges have struggled with problems of constitutional interpretation, exploring 
how meaning is properly derived from the Constitution and, insofar as the answer 
may be different, how courts ought to derive such meaning.”  Id. at 3.
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closest to properly-crafted constitutional doctrine.77  The constitutional 
meaning of Batson—that attorneys must use non-discriminatory bases 
to strike jurors peremptorily—is translated almost immediately to a 
workable constitutional Batson doctrine through the constant and 
regular enforcement mechanisms of the trial court and scrutiny of 
opposing counsel.  
With Batson, there is little room for slippage between 
constitutional meaning and doctrine, because the meaning is enforced 
in the very same space that the doctrine is practiced.  On a less 
theoretical level, this means that the directions given by the Batson
Court and progeny—that the equal protection clause prohibits 
discriminatory striking of potential jurors on the basis of race or 
gender—are easily translated into understandable doctrine by the court 
and counsel because the lapse between violation and cure is minimal.
Legal ethics helps foster the connection between Batson’s 
constitutional meaning and doctrine, because legal ethics contains the 
tradition of imposing procedures and prophylactic rules to ensure that 
the legal profession meets its obligations. The court-made rules that 
govern the implementation of Batson in the trial courts make the most 
sense when viewed through the legal ethics lens because Batson’s 
elaborate procedures parallel and reinforce those normally found in 
legal ethics.  Legal ethics, then, can be seen as the link between 
meaning and doctrine within Batson.
More generally, the Batson doctrine’s means of enforcing 
professional norms make more sense than the traditional means of 
attorney discipline.  For one thing, the difficulty of proving racial and 
gender discrimination to a sufficient degree of confidence makes it 
dangerous to formally discipline attorneys for violating Batson.78 The 
milder sanctions of Batson—reseating of a stricken potential juror, 
retrial or appellate court rebuke on appeal—are more appropriate than 
any kind of formal punishment.  
One reason for preserving the milder sanctions of Batson to more 
severe disciplinary penalties is because racial discrimination is often 
unwitting and unconscious.  The study of cognitive psychology79 has 
77 See Berman, supra note __, at 5 (discussing Fallon’s Implementing the 
Constitution).
78
 In the District of Columbia, however, judges are required to report a finding of a 
Batson violation against a particular lawyer to the professional responsibility officer 
of the D.C. Bar, who can then consider taking formal action.
79
  Cognitive psychology is a school of psychology that examines internal mental 
processes such as problem solving, memory, and language.  Cognitive theory 
contends that solutions to problems take the form of algorithms—rules that are not 
necessarily understood but promise a solution, or heuristics—rules that are 
understood but that do not always guarantee solutions.  See A. J. SANFORD, 
COGNITION AND COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY (1986); H. L. PICK, P. VAN DEN BROEK, 
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shown how people use mental shortcuts in reasoning when making 
assumptions.80  These mental shortcuts in reasoning, or heuristics, are
present in every aspect of life, including the functioning of criminal 
justice system. By shining the spotlight on pretext and bias, Batson
requires lawyers to acknowledge how they impute certain kinds of 
assumptions by bringing their mental shortcuts to bear on the
categories of race and gender.
Batson requires the legal profession to recognize the imputations 
of race and gender, to confront its attitudes about not just the specific 
categories themselves but also about poverty, class subjugation, 
immigration, etc.  By and through the Batson procedure, the criminal 
justice system is forced to recognize the meaning behind these 
supposedly neutral categorizations. Through its ethical imperative,
Batson compels lawyers to question those assumptions; to examine
how they came to these mental shortcuts; and to acknowledge how 
heuristics based on outdated stereotyping and bias can infect the 
criminal jury, even among the most careful and aware.  
In short, the Batson procedure forces us to move beyond the 
heuristics of race and gender, and into the hard, painful work of 
confronting our most basic assumptions.  If American society as a 
whole is still struggling with the difficult legacies left by slavery, 
subjugation and misogyny, then it is unrealistic to expect that these 
legacies have not made their way into the courtroom.  The Batson
procedure plays its part in this troubling task by focusing lawyers’ 
vision on the signaling done by race and gender, drawing out the 
dialogue to include ethnicity and national origin as we start to think 
about these heuristics as well.
This possibility of unconscious discrimination, rooted in 
heuristics, provides another reason that violation of the Batson
doctrine should not lead to disbarment, but instead should be enforced 
in the courtroom during jury selection.  Batson provides a forum in 
which to establish a norm that discourages unconscious discrimination, 
promoting attorneys’ effort to overcome it.  
AND D. C. KNILL, ed., COGNITION: CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
(1992).
80 See, e.g., GERD GIGERENZER, PETER M. TODD, & ABC RESEARCH GROUP, 
SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART (Evolution and Cognition Series)
(19__) (arguing as central thesis of book that people cope in real, complex world of 
confusing , overwhelming information and rapidly approaching deadlines by using 
simple heuristics; Bruce Bower, Simple Minds, Smart Choices, SCIENCE NEWS
(May 29, 1999, pp. 348-349) (same).  The use of simple heuristics as a way of 
making decisions is part of the theory of bounded rationality.  For a comprehensive 
study of heuristics in cognitive psychology, see THOMAS GILOVICH, DALE GRIFFIN 
& DANIEL KAHNEMAN, HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE 
JUDGMENT (Cambridge Univ. 2002).
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Finally, enforcing Batson norms through the criminal trial also 
provides one of the only feasible ways of inculcating the norm not 
only for attorneys, but also for judges.  Though discipline of the bench 
is possible, it happens only rarely, and usually only when there has 
been an extreme violation of legal ethics.81
One scholar has argued that judges “bear substantial responsibility 
for the wrongful striking of minority-race jurors in their jurisdictions, 
for they have acquiesced to it.”82  Calling for a greater bravery among 
judges so they will ask the hard questions of prosecutors, and pointing 
out that it “takes courage to take racial issues seriously, and more 
courage to do so openly,”83 this scholar contends that the legislature 
should make the task of the good prosecutor and trial judge easier by 
requiring ethical rules commanding the asking and answering of such 
hard questions.84
This sort of legislative activity, however, is unnecessary.  Batson’s 
ethical imperative, properly understood, is enough to compel ethical 
behavior from prosecutors, judges and defense counsel.  The very 
public nature of the Batson remedy—the invoking of the Batson
challenge—is, in itself, a incentive for professionally responsible 
behavior.  Because the Batson challenge is taken so seriously by all 
parties involved, the ever-present threat of the doctrine serves to 
regulate appropriate behavior during jury selection.  Additionally, the 
judge’s ability to raise a Batson claim sua sponte also creates another 
strong incentive for counsel to examine their peremptory challenges
for remnants of bias or unconscious discrimination.  No counsel 
wishes to start off the trial in a negative light cast by her 
discriminatory challenges.  Thus, there is no need for legislatures to 
require any more rules about Batson than the doctrine already 
contains, for Batson, by its very existence, reminds lawyers of the 
profession’s ethical aspirations.
81
 A recent example of criminal jurist prosecution is the indictment of Brooklyn trial 
judge Gerald P. Garson, along with six other justices of the Brooklyn Supreme 
Court, for official misconduct, which included accepting bribes and fixing cases.  
See Daniel Wise, NY Lawyer Turns State’s Evidence, New York Law Journal (May 
23, 2003), at http://www.nylawyer.com/news/03/05/052303a.html [last visited 
3/17/05].
82
 Johnson, supra note __, at 477. 
83
 Johnson, supra note __, at 506.
84 See Johnson, supra note __, at 506.
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         D.  A Positive Theory of Developing Batson Doctrine
Approaching Batson through the lens of legal ethics provides a 
positive theory for the development of the doctrine.  Because the 
Constitution is the source of Batson’s ethical imperative, it creates 
natural limits to its expansion.  For example, it is unlikely that Batson
will be extended to include class as a protected category, because there 
is no constitutional right to be free from discrimination on the basis of 
class, like there is race or gender.  Unless new constitutional doctrine 
or statutory obligation intercedes, Batson will remain limited to its 
current categories of race, gender and ethnicity—as the past ten years 
have proven.  
At the same time, however, the fact that legal ethics functions 
as a model for the Batson doctrine does explain the ways in which 
Batson has been extended.  Under a theory of legal ethics, it was only 
natural that Batson was expanded to include strikes by defense 
counsel, since defense counsel, as attorneys, should also be subject to 
Batson’s ethical requirements.  Likewise, it makes sense that the 
Batson doctrine was extended to civil proceedings as well, because 
naturally the Court would want to include civil practitioners into this 
aspirational theory of legal ethics.  Batson’s ethical imperative is a 
broad one, inclusive of all attorneys and judges who participate in jury 
selection, since ethical behavior obviously includes the civil bar and 
bench.  Thus, the expansion of Batson to defense counsel and civil 
cases was a natural progression of legal ethics—a system focused on 
protecting the integrity and reputation of the profession—but one that 
has clear boundaries.
Batson’s evolution from its original expression by the Supreme 
Court has caused much anxiety and concern among legal scholars, 
jurists and practitioners. These anxieties run the gamut from Batson’s 
confusing standards, the injection of bias into criminal jury selection, 
defense counsel’s unclean hands, the inculcation of bias and 
unconscious racism into jury selection, waste of judicial time and 
money; and negative public perception of jury selection. As I explain 
below, however, many of these anxieties over Batson vanish with a 
proper understanding of the doctrine’s aspirational legal imperative.
III. The Evolution of the Peremptory Challenge: How Batson
Changed the Landscape
What can explain all the anxiety about the Batson procedure and 
the peremptory challenge? To answer this question, it is helpful to 
look at Batson and its most recent progeny.  The history of the 
peremptory challenge, on these shores and others, has been 
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exhaustively documented,85 and need not be rehashed here.  A brief 
tour through the Supreme Court jurisprudence of Batson, however, 
will better ground our discussion of the Batson critiques.
In 1986, the Supreme Court abandoned their previous requirement, 
as promulgated in Swain v. Alabama,86 that to prove juror 
discrimination, there must be broad historical evidence of racial 
discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges. Batson v. 
Kentucky held that a defendant could overcome the presumption that 
peremptory challenges were made legitimately through a three step 
process.87
The prohibited discrimination elucidated in Batson, denying 
prosecutors the ability to peremptorily-strike members of the same 
race as the defendant for racially motivated reasons, was subsequently 
extended to protect against peremptory challenges against members of 
a racial group different from the defendant.88  In Powers v. Ohio,89 the 
Supreme Court eliminated the requirement that the excluded juror be 
of the same cognizable racial group as the complaining criminal 
defendant.90
That same year, in Edmundson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,91 the 
Court extended Batson to include the discriminatory exercise of 
peremptory challenges in civil actions between private litigants.  A 
year later, in Georgia v. McCollum,92  third-party standing to raise 
improper exclusion of potential jurors based on race was extended to 
85 See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note __, at 813 – 829 (discussing pre-English history 
of peremptory challenge, the challenge’s English history, and the challenge in the 
U.S. up until Batson);  Carlson, supra note __, at 951-956 (same).
86
 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
87 See 476 U.S. at 96-97.
88 See Carlson, supra note __, at 958-59.
89
 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
90 Powers, 499 U.S. at 404.  A defendant may make a Batson complaint for the 
discriminatory striking of members of any cognizable racial group, including 
whites.  See id. at 411. The Powers court held that the criminal defendant has third 
party standing to raise an equal protection claim chiefly on behalf of an excluded 
juror.  See id. at 411.
91 500 U.S. 614 (1991).  The Court found state action by the private litigant’s 
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, since these challenges are executed by 
a judge, a state actor.  See id. at 619-20.
92
 112 S. Ct 2348 (1992) (get correct cite!).
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the prosecution.93  Finally, the Court held in J.E.B. v. Alabama94 that 
equal protection bars discrimination in jury selection on the basis of 
gender.
Although various lower courts have held that Batson principles 
extend to such categories as religion95 or national origin,96 the 
Supreme Court has not recently broadened Batson any further. In fact, 
the Court declined to extend Batson to Latino and Hispanic jurors in
Hernandez v. New York.97 Despite many predictions of expansion, the 
Court has so far resisted the growth of Batson since J.E.B., and the 
Batson universe has remained stable for over the past ten years. 
IV. Fear and Loathing about Batson:  The Prudential Attacks
The first critique against the post-Batson peremptory challenge 
came, ironically enough, in one of the Batson concurrences.  Although 
joining the majority opinion of the Court, Justice Thurgood Marshall 
took time to write a separate concurrence which pointed out that 
“[m]erely allowing defendants the opportunity to challenge the racially 
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in individual cases will 
not end the illegitimate use of the peremptory challenge.” 98
Justice Marshall’s concern that Batson would not eliminate 
discrimination was the pre-cursor to many current day worries that 
Batson, instead of helping eradicate racial/gender discrimination, 
actually helps hide prejudice in socially acceptable forms.  Marshall
argued that Batson failed to solve the peremptory problem due to three 
93
 The Court concluded that state action exists where a criminal defendant exercises 
peremptory challenges.  See id.  Although peremptory challenges are not 
constitutionally protected fundamental rights, they still involve the state because the 
judge is the moderator and implicator of jury selection, dismissing the stricken 
potential jurors.
94
 511 U.S. 127, 143 (1994).
95 See United States v. Somerstein, 959 F. Supp. 592 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)
(applying Batson to Jewish religion).
96 See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Schriver, __ F. Supp. __ (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Maas, J.) 
(holding that national origin is an impermissible reason for striking a potential 
juror); Rico v. Leftridge-Byrd, 340 F.3d 178, 184 (3d Cir. 2003) (applying Batson
to Italian-American potential jurors); United States v. Bin Laden, 91 F. Supp. 2d 
600, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (Sand, J.) (“[I]t is well settled that equal protection 
principles forbid discriminatory exclusions from jury service on the basis of factors 
such as race and national origin; United States v. Roan Eagle, 867 F.2d 436, 441 
(8th Cir. 1989) (applying Batson to potential jurors of American Indian ancestry).
97
 500 U.S. 352, 361 (1991) (holding that Latino or Hispanic potential jurors could 
be excluded from the jury based upon the race-neutral explanation of their inability 
to accept a translator’s rendition of Spanish-language testimony) .
98 Batson, 476 U.S. at 102 (Marshall, J, concurring).
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major reasons:  (1) “trial courts fac[ing] the difficult burden of 
assessing prosecutor’s motives;”99 (2) “outright prevarication by 
prosecutors”100 and, potentially, defense counsel;101  and (3) coded 
racial prejudice, unarticulated—sometimes even subconscious—but 
difficult to detect.  “‘[S]eat of the pants instincts’ may often be just 
another term for racial prejudice.”102
These concerns led Justice Marshall to conclude that the Court 
should ideally ban peremptories from the criminal justice system,103 as 
the right to peremptory challenges had no “constitutional 
magnitude”104 and could be “withheld altogether;”105 only by “banning 
peremptories entirely can such discrimination be ended.”106
Justice Marshall’s concurrence presciently anticipated many of 
the current concerns about Batson and the peremptory challenge.  
What Justice Marshall did not anticipate, however, was how highly 
evolved the Batson procedure has become, creating a more carefully 
crafted tool than what was Supreme Court initially drafted almost 20 
years ago.  With Justice Marshall as our Virgil,107 we will walk 
99 Batson, id. at 106.
100 Batson,  id. at 106.
101 Batson, id. at 108.  Although of course at that time there was no “reverse-
Batson,” Marshall anticipated that procedure, and the Court’s ruling accompanying 
it, with his comment that “The potential for racial prejudice, further, inhere in the 
defendant’s challenge as well.”
102 Batson, id. at 106.  Marshall goes on to explain, “Even if all parties approach the 
Court’s mandate with the best of conscious intention, that mandate requires them to 
confront and overcome their own racism on all levels—a challenge I doubt all of 
them can meet.”  Id.
103 Batson,  id. at 107 (“The inherent potential of peremptory challenges to distort 
the jury process by permitting the exclusion of jurors on racial grounds should 
ideally lead the Court to ban them entirely from the criminal  justice system.”) 
104 Id.
105 Batson, id. at 108.
106 Id. at 108.
107 See DANTE ALEGHIERI, THE DIVINE COMEDY:  INFERNO, Canto I, Argument (The 
Harvard Classics, 1909–14):
The writer, having lost his way in a gloomy forest, and being 
hindered by certain wild beasts from ascending a mountain, is 
met by Virgil, who promises to show him the punishments of 
Hell, and afterward of Purgatory; and that he shall then be 
conducted by Beatrice into Paradise. He follows the Roman 
poet.
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through the long list of grievances documented against the Batson
procedure to better understand why the Batson procedure and the 
peremptory challenge have managed to stir up such fear, confusion 
and concern.  Moreover, our tour through the Batson grievance list 
will provide another opportunity to better explicate the doctrine’s 
theory of legal ethics.
A. Batson has confusing standards
1.  “Muddled” procedures cause judicial uncertainty 
One complaint that Justice Marshall did not foresee was the 
growing concern about how to interpret and apply Batson.  This anti-
Batson complaint theorizes that judicial understanding of Batson is in 
a state of disarray.108 Therefore, the argument goes, if jurists cannot 
understand how to apply and use Batson properly, it is unlikely
prosecutors and defense counsel could do so.  
Putting aside the perhaps unintended slight to practitioners’ 
capabilities, this concern has been raised primarily by jurists and legal 
scholars.  The gravamen of this complaint is that Batson and 
peremptory challenges should be abolished because standards are a 
muddle, and it is impossible to apply Batson correctly and fairly.  For 
example, one jurist109 in Wamget v. Texas argued that peremptory 
challenges “do not further [the] goal” of ensuring that venirepersons 
can be “fair and impartial,”110 pinning the blame directly on Batson’s 
tail:
Moreover, Batson and its progeny, have made a further 
muck of things by transforming voir dire into a lengthy 
ordeal involving inquiries into inappropriate questions of 
race and ethnicity that not only have nothing to do with 
impartiality, but will also become increasing muddled in 
the face of our changing society.111
Likewise, I hope to use Justice Marshall’s concurrence as a guide to the variety of 
complaints against Batson and the peremptory challenge.
108
  Thanks to Kevin Stack for suggesting this phrasing.
109
 Justice Meyers of the Houston Court of Criminal Appeals.
110 Wamget v. Texas, 67 S.W.3d 851, 860 (Tex. 2001) (Meyers, J., concurring 
opinion) (“By nearly all accounts, the inquiry that ought to be the central concern 
during voir dire is whether the questioned venirepersons can be fair and impartial.  
Judicial rhetoric to the contrary, peremptory challenges do not further this goal.”) 
111 Wamget,  id. at 860.
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It is this fear of “muddle” which has seemingly touched off a firestorm 
of dislike for Batson and peremptory challenges.
Wamget raises a variety of reasons about why the peremptory 
challenge should be abolished,112 but most interesting is the concern 
about confusing standards. The concurrence argues that the problem of 
“defining a cognizable racial/ethnic group”113 is so great that it 
becomes “either absurd or nearly impossible.”114  Using the Hispanic 
classification as example, Wamget notes how difficult it can be to 
determine Latino ancestry from definable physical characteristics, 
surname or language.115
Having identified this potential problem of definition, Wamget
then moves on to another potential problem, distastefulness, observing 
how it, and other courts, has “viewed the prospect of making ethnic 
assessments particularly distasteful and inappropriate.”116 Wamget
then morphs back into its original concern that a logical extension of 
Batson will eventually cover every identifiable group, rolling down the 
slippery slope into confusion and chaos.117
By conflating these two issues of definition and distastefulness, 
however, Wamget muddies—or muddles—the waters itself. The 
“slippery slope” concern over expanding group classifications is 
distinct from the dislike the courts have for entering into any 
cogitation about race, ethnicity or gender, 118 and it is unfair for the 
court to mix the two together into one.  Although a potential concern 
over growing elaborations of classifications is valid enough, simply 
112
 See infra for further articulation of the Wamget court’s concerns.
113 Wamget, id. at 863.
114 Wamget, id. at 863.
115 Wamget, id. at 864-66.
116 Wamget, id. at 866.
117 Wamget, id. at 866.
118
 The intersection of race and gender, or what has come to be called 
“intersectionality,” creates a sum total greater than its parts.  African-American 
women, for example, have multiple identities as result of the oppression that they 
face from being both women and African Americans.  I use the meaning of the term
"intersectional" here following that used by Professor Kimberle Crenshaw, which 
refers to a person's multiple, oppressed identities. Crenshaw argues that this 
multiple discrimination is both heavier than and distinct from the sum of its parts. 
See generally Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and 
Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, 
and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989).  I discuss 
intersectionality in greater detail below.
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because the judiciary dislikes grappling with one of the singular issues 
of our time is not a good enough reason to eliminate the peremptory 
challenge.  
Wamget returns to the problem of confusing standards in the 
final point of the concurrence, when the procedure is criticized for
creating a situation where “courts’ attempts at applying Batson, and in 
particular, at assessing the existence of pretext, are ‘all over the 
map.’”119  It is this very specter of chaos which has galvanized the 
judiciary into fearful prophecy and action;  not only do they fear their 
own inability to consistently apply Batson over time, but they also fear 
the idea of failed uniformity among all courts.120  Despite grudgingly 
recognizing that they are dealing with categories—race and gender—
which may defy easy and uniform black-line rules, the judiciary’s 
discomfort with a lack of “legality”121 had led them to proselytize a 
complete abolition of the peremptory challenge.  
Other jurists have similarly used the rallying cry of “confusing 
standards” as reason to eliminate the peremptory challenge.  In 
Minetos v. CUNY,122 the court123 spent much of its opinion discussing 
its concern over judicial misunderstanding of the Batson procedure, 
which, it concluded, invokes no less of a danger than “invit[ing] 
corruption of the judicial process.”124   After citing Justice Marshall’s
warning about the dangers of the peremptory challenge, the court 
jumps straight to its own heart of darkness:125  the uncertainty and 
confusion it locates squarely in Batson and progeny.  
Arguing that “[a] brief review of the case law shows that 
judicial interpretations of Batson are all over the map,”126 the Minetos
court goes through a representative sample of federal Batson cases, 
with minimal case details, in an attempt to show how courts are very 
bad at “guess[ing]” which are the pretextual reasons and which are 
119 Wamget, id at 867 (quoting and citing Minetos). 
120
 For another example of what this type of fear has wrought, see, for example, the 
(overturned) Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 
121
  I borrow the phrase from Kyron Huigens, in his most recent work about Blakely
& sentencing.  See Kyron Huigens, Solving the Williams Puzzle, 105 COLUM. L. 
REV. (forthcoming May 2005).
122
 925 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Thanks to Kevin Stack for bringing this case 
to my attention.
123
 The Honorable Constance Baker Motley of the Southern District of New York.   
124 Minetos, id. at 183.
125 See JOSEPH CONRAD, HEART OF DARKNESS (1902).
126 Minetos,  id. at 183.
30
not.127 Minetos’s laundry-list of supposedly wildly varying standards 
can be seen as pretext for an attempt to reduce race and gender, and 
the social constructs underlying them, to an almost childlike 
simplicity.  
The Minetos court also raises some concern over New York 
state courts’ attempt to hammer out some guidelines to applying 
Batson’s second step of separating pretext from reasonable.128  The 
court’s concern over New York’s promulgated guidelines contrasts to 
its previous concern over the marked lack of standards for 
distinguishing pretexual from race-neutral reasons in Batson.  So 
although the Minetos court claimed to want clear, bright-line rules for 
the application of the Batson challenge, when given some, its critical 
reaction illustrates some discomfort with the race and gender aspects 
of Batson.
State court jurists have also recently called for the abolition of 
the peremptory challenge due to this concern over muddled standards 
as well.  In a recent case,129 the chief judge of the New York Court of 
Appeals, in an impassioned concurrence, denounced peremptory 
challenges and the Batson procedure as distorting the fundamental 
fairness of the jury process.130  Highlighting an agreement with Justice 
Marshall, the chief judge states, somewhat reluctantly, that “[t]he 
intense focus on factors such as skin color, accent and surname in jury 
selection is wholly at odds with our societal goal of dealing with 
people as individuals, on their personal qualities.”131  The chief judge’s
concern over the “opportunity for mischief”132 with Batson and 
peremptories can be interpreted, among other things, as a concern over 
the standards regulating peremptory challenges under the Batson
procedure.  The chief judge concludes the only solution is that 
peremptory challenges should be either severely reduced or eliminated 
entirely.133
New York jurists have often found fault with Batson over 
muddled standards.  In 1990, another member of the New York Court 
127 Minetos,  id. at 183-84.
128 Minetos,  id. at 184-85.
129People v. Tarkisha Brown, 97 N.Y.2d 500 (2002) (Chief Judge Kaye, 
concurring).
130 Brown, id. at 509.
131 Brown, id. at 509.
132 Brown, id. at 509.
133 Brown,  id. at 509.
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of Appeals134 suggested in a concurrence that the number of 
peremptories in New York should be dramatically reduced, if not 
eliminated entirely.135 Citing the complexity of the Batson procedure 
and “the very profound difficulties”136 involved in “reconciling a juror 
challenge system that is theoretically based on the attorney's 
inexplicable personal hunch with a constitutional rule that requires 
attorneys to offer satisfactory "neutral" explanations for their 
choices,”137 this jurist criticized the current procedure as confusing and 
then argues that despite all its complexity, it does not do its job in 
unmasking racial discrimination.138  This solution spurns the idea of 
working with the Batson procedure as too hard, messy and confusing 
for attorneys and jurists; instead of “developing a complex set of 
judicially imposed limitations and standards,”139 the strong pruning of 
the right to peremptory challenge or the wholesale elimination of the 
tool were offered.
Similarly, two years later, yet another jurist of the New York 
Court of Appeals140 argued that Batson had failed to wipe 
discrimination from the jury selection process.141 Writing a separate 
concurrence to “express a broader concern and perspective,”142 this 
jurist criticizes the Batson procedure for failing to eliminate 
discrimination, claiming that the procedure actually assists in 
disguising impermissible racial motives instead of helping reduce 
them.143  By arguing that “[t]he process that requires courts to sift 
through counsel's words for patterns or pretexts of discrimination has 
not served the goal of cutting the discriminatory weeds out of the jury 
selection process,”144 the so-called failure of the Batson procedure is 
134
 Judge Vito Titone, New York Court of Appeals.
135 People v. Hernandez, 75 N.Y.2d 350, 358-60 (1990) (Tito, J., concurring).
136 Hernandez, id. at 358-59.
137 Hernandez, id. at 358-59.
138 Hernandez, id. at 359.  This case was decided before J.E.B. (1994), however, so 
it was still permissible to strike on the basis of gender.
139 Hernandez, id. at 359. 
140 Judge Joseph Bellacosa, New York Court of Appeals.
141 People v. Bolling, 79 N.Y.2d 317, 325-27 (1992) (concurrence).  Again, this was 
pre-J.E.B., so the court was only dealing with racial discrimination.
142 Bolling, id. at 325.
143 Bolling, id. at 328.
144 Bolling, id. at 328.
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blamed on the allegedly confusing standards and complexity of the 
process.  
Although discussing some other reasons for his dislike of 
Batson,145 this New York jurist returned to a “seemingly endless 
variety of issues and permutations, manifesting the intractable struggle 
of the lower courts to implement the unmanageable and self-
contradictory Batson remedy”146 as one of the primary concerns and 
reasons to remove the peremptory challenge entirely.  Likening the 
ever-evolving Batson procedure to a Sisyphisean effort to “push the 
stone up the mountain”147 the procedure is lambasted as an 
“unworkable remedy,”148 “impractical”149 and consisting of standards 
of “woeful unevenness”150—a procedure too complicated for either 
state or federal trial judges.151
Legal scholars have complained about confusing standards as 
well.  They have argued that trial courts have had difficulty 
distinguishing neutral from pretextual explanations in the Batson
procedure.152 One pair of scholars argues that the peremptory 
challenge has resulted in confusion among state and federal court in 
determining which groups are protected from its nondiscriminatory 
application.153 As one commentator puts it, “Batson is an 
uncontrollable beast that eventually, but lamentably, will destroy the 
peremptory challenge.”154
These reactions illustrate how the fear of Batson and the 
peremptory challenge outmatches the reality of any actual problems 
Batson might create.  In all of the above cases, such radical solutions 
145 See Bolling, id. at 329 (discussing, among other things, its time-wasting aspects 
and its failure to eliminate bias).  For more discussion of these complaints against 
Batson, see below.
146 Bolling, id. at 328-29.
147 Bolling, id. at 329.
148 Bolling, id. at 329.
149 Bolling, id. at 329.
150 Bolling, id. at 329.
151 Bolling, id. at 329.
152 See Note, Eliminating a Safe Haven for Discrimination:  Why New York Must 
Ban Peremptory Challenges from Jury Selection, 3 J.L. & POL’Y 605, 621 (1995).
153
 Vivien and Craig Montz, supra note __, at 451.
154
 Hoffman, supra note ___, at  871 n.5.
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to the Batson “problem” exemplifies the discomfort caused by the 
emergence of race or gender in the courtroom.  For these critics, it 
seems, it is easier to eliminate these procedures entirely than to 
confront, head on, the realities of discrimination in the criminal justice
system. Instead, the call for the abolition of the peremptory challenge 
based on the straw men of “confusing standards,” messiness or 
complexity belies a discomfort with confronting the realities of race, 
ethnicity and gender as manifested in the courtroom and within the 
criminal jury.
This is where the legal ethics approach proves its usefulness.  
Most of these “judicial uncertainty” critics argue that bias is 
irretrievably intertwined into the use of peremptory challenge, and no 
possible procedure or doctrine could eliminate it.  The legal ethics 
approach, however, recognizes that the ethical imperative and 
aspirational standard provided by Batson is enough to overcome most 
of these potential uses of bias in jury selection.  The bias critics 
shortchange both judges and attorneys by assuming that the normative 
framework imposed by Batson has no power to compel and encourage 
appropriate, non-discriminatory behavior.
 It is true that courts and counsel may occasionally have 
difficulty in distinguishing neutral from pretextual strikes. The legal 
ethics approach recognizes, however, that this is not a reason either to 
abandon the attempt to safeguard a non-discriminatory jury selection 
process or to jettison a legal procedure—the peremptory challenge—
that is generally credited with improving jury selection and, later on, 
jury deliberations.   The simple creation of an ethical standard and a 
procedure for considering whether that standard has been followed 
may substantially increase compliance, even if there will inevitably be 
false positives and negatives in particular cases.   
2. Who is a “protected group:” concern over expanding group 
classifications
The second piece of the concern over “confusing standards” is 
focused on what some jurists and academics see as a never-ending 
expansion of group classifications which are protected by Batson.  
This is a classic manifestation of the slippery slope argument alluded 
to above, where opponents of Batson and the peremptory challenge 
argue that because the Batson procedure has slowly expanded to 
include gender and ethnicity, it will soon grow to include all possible 
difference,155 thus becoming completely unworkable.  
155
 Any discussion of race or gender difference is incomplete without mentioning 
difference feminism.  Though too complex a topic to explore in this article, 
difference theory posits that women have deep–rooted and partly biological gender 
differences separating them from men.  See DIANA FUSS, ESSENTIALLY SPEAKING: 
FEMINISM, NATURE AND DIFFERENCE (1990); CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT 
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Another prominent jurist,156 a recent convert (in his own 
words) to abolishing the peremptory challenge, sees this as a major 
concern, arguing that the Batson procedure and peremptory challenge 
should be banished from the criminal justice system. Gloomily 
predicting that the “mutations to Batson are probably far from 
over,”157 this judge predicts that Batson will soon be extended beyond 
race and sex to include, among other things, religion and national 
origin, since the latter are two classifications traditionally deemed 
“suspect” under the Equal Protection Clause.158
Interestingly, some judges are somewhat more comfortable 
with the idea of national origin becoming one of Batson’s protected 
classes.159  One jurist points out that often national origin is used as a 
de facto suspect class, since courts regularly treat “Hispanic” as a race 
for Batson purposes,160 without distinguishing between different 
national origins within the category.161  Although noting that extending 
Batson to national origin162 would “unleash an unseemly and 
uncontrollable parade of horribles,”163 this judge seems to accept that 
most courts want to avoid this problem by disguising national origin as 
race and ethnicity.164
Despite acknowledging that logic would probably compel 
Batson’s extension to national origin,165 however, this same jurist
VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT (1982); LUCE 
IRIGARAY, THIS SEX WHICH IS NOT ONE (1985); CHRIS WEEDON, FEMINISM, 
THEORY, AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE (1999).
156
 Judge Morris B. Hoffman currently serves as a District Court Judge for the 
Second Judicial District of Denver, Colorado.  
157
 Hoffman, supra note __, at  836.
158
 Hoffman, supra note __, at 837.
159
 Hoffman, supra note __, at 837-38.
160 But see Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (holding that Latino jurors 
could be excluded from jury based on admitted inability to accept translator’s 
rendition of Spanish-language testimony).
161
 Hoffman, supra note __, at 837-38.
162
 So far, Batson protection has been extended to Native Americans, see United 
States v. Roan Eagle, 867 F.2d 436, 441 (8th Cir. 1989), whites, see Virgin Islands 
v. Forte, 865 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1989), and Asians.
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refuses to recognize the indeterminacy of race and ethnicity in the first 
place.166  By desiring a bright-line rule distinguishing race, on the one 
hand, and national origin, on the other, this judge falls into the same 
old trap that the majority of peremptory challenge abolitionists fall:  
that is, a disinclination to deal with the realities of race and ethnicity, 
which cannot be separated from the contours of national origin.  
Something as slippery as the concept of racial and ethnic identity 
simply cannot be categorized by legalistic, bright-line rules.  So 
although the judge is correct that national origin, itself an amorphous 
category, should be considered a suspect class for Batson, his dislike 
of a possible Batson expansion simply belies a common 
misunderstanding of the complicated ramifications of racial/ethnic 
categorization in modern American life.
The expansion of the Batson challenge to religion is sometimes 
deemed “most problematic of all.”167   Despite current judicial 
disinclination, on both the state and federal level, to extend Batson to 
religious belief,168 some worry that if religion, a First Amendment 
right, becomes a protected class under Batson, then there will be no 
stopping the tide, forcing courts to protect other “particular 
philosophical or political belief[s].”169  There is a particular terror 
about the enmeshing of First Amendment law with the jury trial, which 
claims that “[o]nce a prospective juror’s general beliefs are declared 
out of bounds for peremptories, only the tiniest informational 
platforms will be left from which counsel will be able to take their 
insupportable and illogical leaps into folk wisdom.”170
Other critics argue that a “further logical extension” of Batson
would include applying its protections to other jurors’ First 
Amendment rights.171  They contend that “once the door is open to 
166
 Another way to think about the indeterminacy of race and ethnicity is to discuss 
it in terms of fluidity of identity.  Some scholars believe that race (and to a lesser 
extent, gender) is a fluid state, not easily confined to simple definitions. “Race may 
be America's single most confounding problem, but the confounding problem of 
race is that few people seem to know what race is.”   Ian F.H. Lopez, The Social 
Construction of Race HARVARD C.R.-C.L. L. REV 1, 6-7 (1994) (arguing that 
“[r]ace is neither an essence nor an illusion, but rather an ongoing, contradictory, 
self-reinforcing process subject to the macro forces of social and political struggle 
and the micro effects of daily decisions.”)
167
 Hoffman, supra note __, at 839.
168 See, e.g., State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1993) (permissible to strike 
juror due to religion), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
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 Hoffman, supra note __, at 839.  
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  Hoffman, supra note __, at 840.
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protecting jurors’ religious freedoms, then their speech and association 
freedoms should similarly be protected.”172
The fear of an expanding Batson is shared by many legal 
scholars. One critic, who also wants to abolish the peremptory 
challenge, identifies disability, age, wealth, religious affiliation and 
sexual orientation as possible future protected groups.173 This critic 
argues that the Supreme Court’s focus “has shifted from the guarantee 
of a party to a fair trial by an impartial jury to the protection of equal 
protection rights of excluded jurors to be free from improper 
discrimination,”174 since she foresees any classification requiring strict 
or heightened scrutiny as soon to require Batson protection as well.175
Similarly, another critic argues that the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the Batson line of case cannot logically be limited to 
peremptory exclusions based on race and gender.176  Citing standard 
constitutional jurisprudence, this scholar posits that the Batson
rationale should prevent the peremptory removal of jurors because of 
their political views, group memberships, prior involvement with the 
justice system, to take a few examples.177  In attempting to reconcile 
the fair cross-section of the jury doctrine with Batson jurisprudence,178
172
 V. & C. Montz, supra note __, at 465.
173
 Carlson, supra note __, at  949.
174
 Carlson, supra note __, at 967.
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 Carlson, supra note __, at 967-68.  Carlson seems particularly concerned about 
this because of the then-recent decision of the Court in J.E.B., which held that 
gender-based strikes are impermissible.  Since gender, under Title VII 
classification, only merits heightened scrutiny, Carlson sees this as an opening for 
all sorts of new Batson protection—a prophecy that has not borne out fruit so far in 
the 11 years since the piece was published.  
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 Leipold, supra note __, at 949. 
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 Leipold, supra note __, at 949.
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 As Leipold explains:
A defendant is . . . placed in a strange position:  he is entitled to 
a jury drawn from a fair cross section specifically because it 
increases the odds that different groups and perspectives will be 
represented in the jury pool, which in turn helps ensure that the 
panel is impartial;   when actually seating a jury, however, he 
may not take these same characteristics into account.  He may 
not base his peremptory strikes on the very same proxy for 
viewpoints that the Court has already used to justify the cross-
section requirement, even if his efforts are designed to bring 
about the exact benefit that the cross-section requirement 
provides.  An attempt to support the cross-section requirement 
on impartiality grounds thus runs headlong into the rule that race 
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which would result in a more robust Sixth Amendment and Batson
doctrine, he sees part of the cost of this reconciliation as the death of 
the peremptory challenge.179 This critic does not mourn the 
peremptory challenge’s death, because he sees the value added by 
peremptory strikes as, at best, taking an already fair jury and making it 
fairer.180
Much of this criticism can be seen as an outgrowth of the 
anxiety Batson creates.  There is no sign that any court in any 
jurisdiction is planning to substitute the protected groups of Batson
with either the protected groups of the First Amendment or of Title 
VII.  The tactics of these Batson opponents do cause some concern.  
By conflating two different theories into one—specifically, the 
theories underlying the protected groups of the First Amendment with 
the theories underlying the suspect classification of Batson and, more 
broadly, Title VII—these anti-Batson activists are trying to prompt the 
banning of peremptories.  
Critical race theory is a useful analytical structure to
understand the slippery slope argument.181  Critical race theory posits 
that racial and gender identity is fluid, resisting easy categorization. 
The slippery slope concern with expanding Batson categorizations is 
really a concern about the fluidity of identity, particularly the fluidity 
of racial identity.  The current categories of Batson—race, gender, and 
sometimes ethnicity—are problematic to these critics because of their 
lack of defined boundaries.182  This, however, is less a problem with 
or gender may not be used as a substitute for inclinations, biases, 
or possible votes.
Leipold, supra note __, at 965.
179
 Leipold, supra  note __, at 949.
180
 Leipold, supra note __, at 982.
181
 For a survey of critical race theory, see Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, 
Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography, 79 VA. L. REV. 461 (1993).
182 For example, often blacks, Hispanics, and Asians can “pass” for white. 
Moreover, when a potential juror has mixed-race ancestry, it is sometimes difficult 
to determine, without asking, to which racial or ethnic group the potential 
venireperson belongs.  This should not be seen as a reason to eliminate the 
peremptory challenge, however.  Batson forces us to recognize race and gender in 
jury selection—specifically, the fluidity of racial and gender roles in our society.  
As much as we would like to easily place people—let along venirepersons—into 
simple, definable categories, racial and gender identity resist this categorization.  
For more on the fluidity of racial identity, see generally IAN F.H. LOPEZ, WHITE BY 
LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF WHITENESS (1996).
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Batson than with our systems of social categorization.183 As one 
theorist notes, we “need to account for multiple grounds of identity 
when considering how the social world is constructed.”184
As one commentator has observed, “Because race exists as an 
integral, structural component of social reality and human relations, 
racial remediation is impossible except in the company of wide-
ranging social reform and human advancement.”185 Batson requires 
this sort of racial and gender remediation every time the doctrine is 
invoked because it forces an examination of the fluidity of race and 
gender, which themselves are socially constructed terms.186 It is 
important to openly discuss race and gender—and the intersection of 
race and gender187--during criminal jury selection as part of the 
183
 Of course, as Lopez argues, the law itself plays a large role in reifying racial 
identities:
Race suffuses all bodies of law, not only obvious ones like civil 
rights, immigration law,  and federal Indian law,  but also property 
law, contracts law,  criminal law, federal courts, family law, and even 
"the purest of corporate law questions within the most 
unquestionably Anglo scholarly paradigm." I assert that no body of
law exists untainted by the powerful astringent of race in our society.
 Lopez, The Social Construction of Race, supra note __, at  3.
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 Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity and 
Violence Against Women of Color __ STANFORD L. REV. 1242, 1244 (1991).  As 
Crenshaw argues, “The problem with identity politics is not that it fails to transcend 
difference, as some critics charge, but rather the opposite--that it frequently 
conflates or ignores intragroup differences.”  Id. at 1242.
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 Lopez, Social Construction of Race,  supra note __, at 8. 
186 Most critical race theorists do not subscribe to a vision of biologically 
determined races, but instead implicitly view race as a social product. John Calmore 
suggests that "[c]ritical race theory begins with a recognition that 'race' is not a fixed 
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Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire Music: Securing an 
Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2129, 2160 
(1992).  
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 Both critical race and feminist theorists have noted the problem of 
intersectionality when discussing identity.  As Serena Mayeri observes, “Kimberle 
Crenshaw, Angela Harris, Regina Austin and other intersectionality theorists have 
exposed the tendency of antiracist and feminist discourses to ignore and erase 
women of color by imagining men as the quintessential targets of race 
discrimination, and white women as the classic sex discrimination victims.”  Serena 
Mayeri, Note, Race-Gender Analogies, 110 Yale L. J. 1045, 1049-50 (2001). Since 
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response to groups as who fall in both protected classes.  Intersectionality affects 
Batson because of Batson’s focus on race and gender; when a Batson challenge is 
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attempt to eradicate racism and sexism within the criminal justice 
system.188
Though there is a genuine issue regarding where to draw the 
line in extending the Batson challenge, these types of slippery slope 
arguments which either obfuscate the complexity of racial and ethnic 
categories or deliberately confuse suspect classification with protected 
groups are a bit disingenuous. What these critics of Batson fail to 
realize is that like everything else in the criminal justice system, the 
Batson procedure and peremptory challenge as they currently stand 
provide counsel the freedom to select a fair, impartial jury within a 
more rigid set of rules and procedures.  Defense counsel do not have 
total freedom to strike any juror they want, nor are they totally rule-
bound as to who they might discard. Criminal procedure, like many 
other things in our rule of law, is a living, flexible institution, 
providing much more stability—and, paradoxically—freedom than 
these critics will admit.   
Moreover, as I discuss infra Part I(d), because the Constitution 
is the source of Batson’s ethical imperative, this limits the categories 
to which the doctrine can be expanded.   For example, despite fears of 
the slippery slope critics, class is unlikely to be added to the Batson
pantheon of protected classifications, because class is not protected by 
the Equal Protection Doctrine.   The same argument can be extended 
to religion; although religion is protected by the First Amendment, it is 
not covered by the Fourteenth.  Since Batson doctrine is rooted firmly 
in the 14th Amendment (indeed, the Court rejected using Sixth 
Amendment jurisprudence to bolster the doctrine),189 it is highly 
raised, lawyers are forced to examine their belief systems not only about the 
separate categories of race or gender separately, but also how race and sex 
discrimination are often intertwined.  For a comprehensive bibliography of 
intersectionality compiled by Jean Ait Amber Belkhir, see 
http://www.asanet.org/sections/rgcbiblio.html [last visited 3/7/05].  See also Regina 
Austin, Sapphire Bound, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 539; Kimberle Crenshaw, 
Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of 
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 139; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 
42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990).  
188
 In this way, I follow the path of Lopez and Mari Matsuda in “attempting to 
develop a jurisprudence that accounts for the role of racism in American law and 
that works toward the elimination of racism as part of a larger goal of eliminating 
all forms of subordination." Mari Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, 
Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 
YALE L.J. 1329, 1331 n.7 (1991).
189 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 84 n. 4 (“We agree with the state that resolution of 
petitioner’s claim properly turns on application of equal protection principles and 
express no view on the merits of any of petitioner’s Sixth Amendment arguments”).
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unlikely that the Court will forbid striking jurors on religious grounds, 
because there is no constitutional basis for doing so.
Finally, as one prominent scholar has noted, “Lincoln, Holmes, 
and Frankfurter have recognized [that] slippery slope arguments are of 
limited utility.”190  Although the metaphor of the slippery slope 
suggests that there’s only one way through which the slippage 
happens, there are actually many different ways that decision A (here, 
Batson forbidding strikes based on race and gender) can make decision 
B (Batson forbidding strikes based on class) more likely.191  However, 
many of these ways have little to do with the mechanisms that people 
often think about when confronted with the “slippery slope.”192
This scholar discusses “judicial-judicial slippery slopes, ” the 
mechanism of slippery slope that is operating here.193 Batson critics 
use a “legal effect slippery slope” mechanism by arguing that because 
decision B follows from decision A, court will feel bound to follow 
decision B simply as an application of an existing legal rule (the 
obligation to follow precedent).194 As this scholar points out, 
however, “this legal effect slippery slope doesn’t by itself provide 
much of an argument against result A, because advocates of A could 
simply urge that courts decide A based on a narrower justification that 
avoids the excessive breadth or the added authority.”195
This is precisely the case with the Batson slippery slope 
argument.  The slippery slope critics argue that Batson will soon be 
broadened to include, say, religion because the Constitution, through 
the First Amendment, forbids prejudice on the basis of religion.  
Batson, however, is based on a different constitutional justification—
the Equal Protection Clause—which avoids the potential excessive 
breadth of the doctrine about which the critics are so concerned.196
190
 Eugene Volokh, Beyond the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV __ (2003).
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 Of course, as Volokh argues, “a judge deciding whether to adopt proposed 
principle A may worry that future judges, who have their own understandings of 
equality or administrability that the original judge does not share, might deliberately 
broaden B.  And there’s little that the original judge can do when adopting A to 
prevent this broadening.”  Id. at 4b.  This issue is not likely to affect Batson
doctrine, however,  since not only is it unclear whether the Batson Court considered 
slippery slopes when initially fashioning the doctrine, it also is unlikely that any 
current Courts would not follow the line of Batson jurisprudence already 
promulgated, none of which falls down the slippery slope.
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B. Batson wastes time and money
Another common complaint against the peremptory challenge 
and the Batson procedure is that both waste valuable court time by 
slowing down the jury selection process.  Jurists argued this point from 
the beginning, claiming that the “already unduly lengthened jury 
selection process”197 will be further fragmented and interrupted by 
Batson.198  This vision of never-ending jury selection is also echoed by 
Texas jurists,199 one of whom argued that “Batson claims will 
inevitably grow in number, compelling hour upon hour of inquiry into 
venirepersons’ ethnic backgrounds and heritage and further inquiry 
into the supposed thoughts and impulses of the proponent of the strike, 
issues that are irrelevant to juror impartiality.”200 New York jurists201
have raised concerns about the “huge, expensive waste of juror 
time,”202 and conceptualized it as a public problem.  And no less a 
figure than Justice Scalia has expressed worry that expanding the 
Batson doctrine would add “another complexity to an increasingly 
Byzantine system of justice that devotes more and more of its energy 
to sideshows and less to the merits of the case.”203
Fewer legal scholars are worried about the aspect of time-
wasting.  Those who have raised the concern have focused on “the 
procedural morass”204 Batson has allegedly created in the trial courts 
as well as “the clogged dockets”205 of the appellate courts when 
197 Bolling, 79 N.Y.2d at 329.
198 Bolling, 79 N.Y.2d at 329.
199
 Justice Meyers.
200 Wamget, 67 S.W.3d at 867 (concurrence).  See also Minetos, 925 F. Supp. at 183 
(“All peremptory challenges should now be banned as an unnecessary waste of time 
and an obvious corruption of the judicial process.”)
201
 Chief Judge Judith Kaye of the New York Court of Appeals.
202 Brown, 97 N.Y.2d at 509.
203 Edmondson, 500 U.S. at 645 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (objecting to 
extension of Batson to civil cases, since “amount of judges’ and lawyers’ time 
devoted to implementing today’s newly discovered Law of the Land will be 
enormous.”)
204
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contested Batson issues are appealed.  As the one pair of critics argues, 
the current form of the peremptory challenge results in mini-hearings 
and potential appeals on each strike, and the efficacy of the procedure 
is highly questionable.206 Underlining the administrative costs207 of 
Batson disputes, these concerns value expediency over due process, 
costs over defendants’ rights. 
What these complaints all share is a refusal to recognize the 
importance of criminal jury selection as not only a constitutional due 
process right of the defendant but an important way for the public to 
participate in the process of criminal justice.  Although further 
safeguards and procedures may indeed lengthen the average time of a 
criminal jury trial, thus costing the states and federal government 
money, this is not all bad.  By forcing the criminal justice system to 
spend time, effort and money on choosing an impartial jury, Batson
helps signal to everyone that fairness and procedural due process is an 
intrinsic part of the criminal justice system, one that cannot be shunted 
off by hasty or careless selection of venirepersons.  
The spectacle of criminal justice, as enacted in the criminal 
jury room, is sometimes just as important as the implementation of 
such justice.  The careful procedures of Batson and the laws 
surrounding the use of peremptory challenges ensure that criminal jury 
selection is always first and foremost in the collective societal mind. 
The importance of illustrating the primacy of jury selection, no matter 
what the costs, ties into the theory of moral lawyering referenced 
above.  A lawyer with integrity and moral character understands that 
sometimes judicial resources must be spent to ensure not only the 
actuality of fairness and justice, but the display of it as well.  Because 
the right to participate in the jury is a right not only of the defendant 
but also the potential juror and the community at large, it is worth 
occasionally halting the adversarial process that marks the rest of the 
jury trial for an exercise in ethics, fairness and non-discriminatory 
norms.  If lawyers have “tremendous responsibility for the 
administration of justice,”208 then the Batson procedure, despite its use 
of judicial time and money, is one way to ensure lawyers have greater 
moral accountability for non-discriminatory behavior in jury selection.
C. Peremptory challenges inject bias into judicial proceedings
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 Leipold, supra note __, at 1002.  Leipold observes that “Batson disputes are 
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43
The “Batson causes bias” concern is also prominent among both 
jurists and legal scholars. The “bias” concern seeks to pin all the bias 
potentially inherent in criminal jury selection on the Batson procedure 
itself.  Bias is a particularly great concern within jury selection 
because of the right to an impartial jury; an indispensable component 
of the defendant’s right to an impartial jury is the elimination of biased 
jurors.209  Thus, there is a tension between Batson’s antidiscrimination 
principle (permitting striking of potential jurors only for 
constitutionally-permitted reasons) and the general principle of 
peremptory challenges (encouraging striking of potential jurors due to 
their bias or favoritism).210
The bias concern is prevalent among legal scholars and jurists.  
Among jurists, a common worry is a fear of hidden motives among 
both defense counsel and prosecutors.  To put it another way, there is 
fear that criminal lawyers will mask their true intentions with 
believable, if false, race-neutral reasoning. As one jurist put it, 
“Batson brings to the surface and appears to ratify crude and 
unbecoming ways of classifying human beings and to disapprove some 
individious discrimination while apparently validating much more.”211
This judge argues that the Batson procedure’s three-step process has 
become less an obstacle to racial discrimination than a “road map” to 
disguised discrimination.212  Many members of the judiciary believe 
peremptories to be “probably the single most significant means by 
which such prejudice and bias are injected into the jury selection 
system,”213 and therefore should be eliminated.
209 See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961) (noting that due process violated 
when accused is denied fair trial).
210
 The second possibility, that of jurors themselves having biased or stereotypical  
opinions, is outside the scope of this article, as this scenario involves not 
peremptory challenges but challenges for cause.   For a detailed exploration of the 
issues involved with for-cause challenges, see Abraham Abramovsky and Jonathan 
I. Edelstein, Challenges for Cause in New York Criminal Cases, 64 ALBANY L. 
REV. 583 (2000).   Abramovsky and Edelstein’s article is primarily relevant here in 
that it spends much of its time attempting to unearth “hidden bias” in for-cause 
challenge, exemplifying the way in which legal scholars, among others, have a 
constant preoccupation with rooting out bias in jury selection.  
211 Bolling, 79 N.Y.2d at 326 (Bellacosa, J., concurring) (quoting and citing 
Alshuler, supra note __, at 201).
212 Bolling, 79 N.Y.2d at 330 (Bellacosa, J., concurring) (citing to Serr and Maney, 
Racism, Peremptory Challenges and the Democratic Jury:  The Jurisprudence of a 
Delicate Balance, 79 J. CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 59 (1988).
213 Bolling, 79 N.Y.2d at 331 (Bellacosa, J, concurring).
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The Supreme Court’s decision in Purkett v. Elem214 has been 
criticized by many as furthering hidden discrimination in jury 
selection.215 Purkett relaxed the second stage of Batson’s burden-
shifting analysis, holding that a litigant’s explanation for a peremptory 
challenge did not have to be “persuasive, or even plausible” for it to be 
legitimate.216 Purkett clarified that a legitimate reason does not have 
to make sense, but only has to be one that “does not deny equal 
protection.”217  Scholars claim that this clarification of the Batson
doctrine has created confusion among the lower courts, as 
theoretically, any reason would now satisfy Batson’s second step.218
Among scholars, there has been some exploration into what 
“pretext” really means.  In her examination of the meaning of 
“pretext” and “discriminatory intent,” one scholar argues that there 
will always be some amount of deception and discrimination in jury 
selection.219 Although a finding of pretext may serve as very strong 
evidence of unconstitutional discriminatory intent, the two do not 
necessary correlate—either there can be pretext without discrimination 
or discrimination without pretextual findings.220
The nuances of discriminatory behavior in jury selection, whether 
overt or unconscious or some combination of the two, are also of much 
interest.221  Critics fear that though courts can occasionally “smoke 
out” instances or self-deception or “unconscious racism,” the trial 
court is ultimately unable to find and recognize bias, arguing that self-
deception on the part of attorneys is so difficult to identify that a court 
214
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would be hard-pressed to uncover it through the mask of an allegedly 
race-neutral reason.222
Certain scholars claim that peremptories not only instill bias but 
also fail to do their job. Some argue that peremptories are not “a 
narrowly tailored way” of advancing the removal of jurors at the ends 
of the bias spectrum.223  Criticizing peremptories as “exercised in an 
arbitrary and capricious manner, based on sudden impressions and 
unaccountable prejudices, which are often crudely stereotypical and 
may in many cases be hopelessly mistaken,”224 a critic contends that 
peremptories only mildly advance lawyers’ goals.225
Another critic charges that the Batson process has become a 
charade, arguing that “any experienced trial attorney” would know 
better than to state any preference for or aversion to a particular race, 
gender or ethnicity.226 This critic contends that these same trial 
attorneys can easily undermine any trial judge’s attempted 
examination of the unstated or subconscious.227
Other commentators have concluded that peremptory challenges 
do more harm than good because their discriminatory use outweighs 
any helpful use they might have.228 One observes that in considering 
the various roles we expect the jury to fulfill, we must consider 
whether the peremptory challenge hinders or helps the jury to fulfill 
those roles.229 This critic contends that peremptory challenges “permit 
discrimination in a setting that should be free from all 
discrimination,”230 and that sort of discrimination—i.e., counsel’s 
choice in shaping the jury—should not be allowed for anyone, 
222 See Charlow, supra note __, at 22-23.
223
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constitutionally protected group or not.  All peremptory challenges, 
permissible or not, are criticized as rooted in outdated and incorrect 
stereotypes handed down from trial manuals and fellow litigators.231
Once peremptory challenges are removed, it is argued, a jury would be
fully heterogeneous and free from bias.232
Implicit bias regarding race and gender pervades every aspect of 
our social discourse, however.233  This includes the criminal justice 
system as well.  Blaming the Batson procedure and the peremptory 
challenge for all of the instances of bias present in criminal jury 
selection is a classic example of throwing the baby out with the 
bathwater.   As legal scholars have come to realize, “Race colors law, 
crime, and community.”234  Simply eliminating Batson will not erase 
race or gender from the criminal jury selection process.
This is not to say that some of the concerns raised above about 
counsel using peremptory challenges improperly—consciously or 
unconsciously—do not exist.  Undoubtedly these examples persevere, 
and occasionally a potential juror may be struck for impermissible 
reasons that are not remedied by the Batson procedure.  However, the 
sometimes failure of a useful remedy does not justify the wholesale 
elimination of not only the remedy but also the tool itself.  
Additionally, as I discuss above, because discrimination can be 
unconscious and implicit, Batson provides the best forum to establish a 
norm that attorneys should seek to overcome it.  By inculcating a non-
discrimination norm, Batson encourages lawyers and judges to root out 
their potentially discriminatory thoughts and deeds to meet the 
doctrine’s ethical aspirations.
D. Defense counsel’s improper use of peremptory challenges and 
manipulation of the Batson procedure 
Both legal scholars and jurists have argued that the Batson
procedure can be taken advantage of by defense counsel.  One way 
defense counsel misuse Batson, it is argued,235 is by implanting 
reversible error into the trial by striking jurors on impermissible bases, 
231
 Marder, supra note __, at 1079.
232
 Marder, supra note ___, at 1097.
233 See Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, HARVARD L. REV. (forthcoming March 
2005) (arguing that most people have implicit biases in the form of negative beliefs 
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235 See Montzes, supra note __, at 470, worrying about this very scenario.
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slipping these impermissible reasons by the trial court through the use 
of allegedly race-neutral reasons, and then taking advantage of the trial 
court’s failure to see through these false reasons to obtain a new 
trial.—what I dub the “unclean hands” issue.
This particular concern is born out of the circuit split between 
the Fifth and Seventh Circuit over whether a defendant may receive a 
new trial based on the discriminatory peremptory strikes of her own 
defense counsel.236 In United States v. Huey,237 the Fifth Circuit held 
that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to protect the 
equal protection rights of the five black jurors who were peremptorily 
challenged by the defense.238 Because the trial court “failed to 
discharge its clear duty” either to elicit a race-neutral explanation for 
the peremptory challenges or deny the use of those challenges, Huey
found that the trial court committed reversible error in implicitly 
determining that the equal protection rights of these jurors has not 
been violated, requiring a new trial.239 Although acknowledging the 
irony in reversing the defendant’s conviction given that it was his 
counsel who made the discriminatory strikes, the Huey court was 
convinced that the result was consistent with the teachings of Batson, 
since, “[i]n addition to harming individual defendants and prospective 
jurors, racial discrimination in the selection of jurors impugns the 
integrity of the judicial system and the community at large.”240
The Seventh Circuit, however, in United States v. Boyd,241
disagreed with the Fifth Circuit on whether a defendant should get a 
new trial when her own counsel has committed the discriminatory 
strikes.  Boyd held that the defense counsel’s improper use of 
peremptory challenges did not warrant a new trial absent ineffective 
assistance of counsel, arguing that the defendant could not protest, on 
appeal, his own agent’s “tactical decision.”242
236
 This fear is also articulated in Fulfilling the Promise of Batson, supra note __, 
where the author postulates that defense counsel will rely on bias as a reason to 
strike jurors in her discussion of the circuit split.
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238 Huey, 76 F.3d at 640.
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240 Huey, 76 F.3d at 741.  See also Mata v. Johnson, 99 F.3d 1261, 1270 (5th Cir. 
1996) (holding  trial court’s determination that exclusion of black potential jurors 
from defendant’s jury, by mutual agreement between prosecution and defense, was 
contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent, but failing to grant new 
trial). 
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Boyd raised the prospect that many a Batson critic has echoed:  
Many a defendant would like to plant an error and grow a 
risk- free trial:  an acquittal is irrevocable under the 
double jeopardy clause, and a conviction can be set aside.  
But steps the court takes at the defendant’s behest are not 
reversible, because they are not error; even the “plain 
error” doctrine does not ride to the rescue when the 
choice has been made deliberately, and the right in 
question has been waived rather than forfeited.243
By assuming that the defendant is interchangeable with her counsel,244
and further assuming that both defense counsel and defendants would 
do practically anything to get off scot-free, ethical or no, the Boyd
court neatly summarizes the prevailing attitude of the “unclean hands” 
complaint:  that defense counsel are not to be trusted.
Another, more general concern over defense counsel tactics is 
their alleged ability to twist the Batson procedure to their nefarious 
ways, despite the eyes of the prosecutor and the trial court. For 
example, Justice Thomas, in Miller- El v. Cockrel, argued that one 
reason to ignore the jury shuffling in the case was that the defense 
allegedly used the tactic itself to eliminate whites from the jury.245
These critiques evince a larger distrust of defense counsel, who 
are believed to be unethical bottom-feeders who would do anything to 
win their cases. Not only does this view do damage to the general 
view of criminal defense attorneys, but it injures the reputation of all 
who practice within the criminal justice system.  By alleging that 
criminal defense counsel are so evasive and untruthful as to be able to 
fool prosecutors and trial courts, doubt is cast on the abilities of the 
latter.   The “unclean hands” critique insults the entire criminal legal 
profession.
243 Boyd, 86 F.3d at 722.
244
 The Second Circuit disagrees with Boyd on the matter of defendant and defense 
counsel being interchangeable.  In United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 
2002), the court held that the defendant’s consent to the district court’s 
impermissible reconstruction plan did not constitute a valid waiver of their claim 
that the jury was improperly partial, despite explicitly consenting to the proposal, on 
the record.  See id. at 204.  As the Nelson court noted, “the defendant’s acceptance 
of an improper jury selection plan . . . does not constitute a valid waiver.”  Id. at 
205.
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The reasoning in Boyd, however, is not wholly bereft of ethical 
utility.  Based on the legal ethics framework, the Seventh Circuit’s 
approach makes the most “ethical sense” to the unclean hands 
problem.  The problem, ethically, with Huey’s approach is that it is too 
obsessed with assuring that there is a remedy for every wrong.  In the 
process, the Fifth Circuit has created a right that threatens to create 
tension among the different legal ethical obligations of defense 
counsel.  Acting in the best interest of the client, with the Huey
approach, would seem to require the lawyer to violate Batson to create 
an appealable issue.  This leads to the adversarial framework of 
lawyering that causes so much concern to current legal ethics scholars, 
and undermines the moral integrity that I locate within the Batson
doctrine.
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit’s approach would still 
command that trial courts consider strikes by defense counsel.  This 
approach would not, however, entertain the admittedly paradoxical 
spectacle of defendants complaining about their lawyers striking jurors 
in their own favor, even based on discriminatory reasoning.  To 
encourage, even mildly, defense counsel to act amorally in service of 
their clients would create “‘extreme partisanship’ on behalf of the 
client and ‘moral non-accountability’ for the lawyer's actions in pursuit 
of the client's goals.”246  This is precisely what Batson discourages.
Batson doctrine, by promoting ethical integrity and non-discriminatory 
behavior, endorses an attorney’s personal moral responsibility, which 
would preclude acting unethically even in zealous advocacy for the 
client.
E. “Whose right is it anyway:”247 negative public perception of the 
criminal jury process
The Supreme Court has observed that discrimination in jury 
selection causes harm to the litigants, the community and the 
individual jurors who are wrongfully excluded from participation in 
the judicial process.248 “[J]ury service—a privilege and duty of 
246
 Pearce, supra note __, at 1805.
247
 Underwood, supra note __, at 725.
248 J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 129.  The Court went on to note that:
Striking individual jurors on the assumption that they hold particular 
views simply because of their gender is practically a brand upon 
them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferiority.  It 
denigrates the dignity of the excluded juror, and . . . reinvokes a 
history of exclusion from political participation.  The message it 
sends to all those in the courtroom, and all those who may later learn 
of the discriminatory act, is that certain individuals. . . are presumed 
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citizenship— [is a] fundamental means of participating in 
government.”249 There is no question that there is a public right to 
serve on the jury,250 and that this right must be balanced against the 
defendant’s right to an impartial jury.  
Various critics of Batson and the peremptory challenge, 
however, have so enshrined the public’s right to serve on a jury that it 
trumps the defendant’s right to an impartial jury. As a jury trial 
scholar has noted, “[t]he goal of protecting those summoned to serve, 
once a background feature, has now moved to the center of the 
analysis.”251
One prominent critic, for example, in her observation that two 
competing visions of the jury underlie the debate about peremptory 
challenges, argues that the image of the jury as a public institution 
should predominate, because the community that can potentially serve 
on the jury has changed over time, from white men to all citizens, and 
if the jury is to reflect a heterogeneous society, exclusion by 
peremptory should be unacceptable.252 She also contends that the 
struggle of certain groups to serve on the jury has given an additional 
meaning to jury service, which not also “signifies the political acts of 
belonging to a community and participating as a full and equal 
citizen.”253 This scholar concludes that re-imagining the jury without 
the peremptory would allow her “vision of the jury as a public 
institution” to thrive.254
unqualified by state actors to decide important questions upon which 
reasonable persons could disagree.
Id. at 141-42.
249 People v. Allen, 86 N.Y.2d 101, 108 (1995) (citations omitted).
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Likewise, another Batson critic contends that the real harm in 
racially motivated jury selection is incurred by the excluded jurors and 
the stigmatized group to which they belong.255 This scholar contends
that there is no satisfactory way to explain how "race-based jury 
selection discriminates against the defendant, as distinct from the 
jurors."256 Flipping the traditional view of jury selection on its head, 
she basically argues in favor of treating racial discrimination as a 
violation of jurors’, rather than litigants’ rights.257
Interesting, the public also possesses specific views on the ir
right to serve on a jury.  A recent newspaper article documented how 
82% of all New York State jurors called for jury service never make it 
past voir dire, and how the rates elsewhere in the country are not much 
better.258 This “82% problem” was so disturbing to the New York 
judiciary that they formed the Commission on the Jury;  “having so 
many people report to the jury room only to be rejected in voir dire 
leaves the public with a negative impression of what it means to 
perform one of the core duties of citizenship.”259  The Commission is
currently considering whether to reduce the number of peremptory 
challenges in New York criminal cases.260
A recent scholarly study of juror attitudes towards the criminal 
jury and the peremptory challenge observed that according to the 
Batson critics, “the net result of all these problems with the 
peremptory is the creation of an embittered and cynical group of 
former jurors.”261 This study documented how these critics believe
that citizens who observe modern jury selection practices are disgusted 
as they watch the adversarial process of jury selection--particularly the 
excused, who are especially resentful.262
The study pointed out, however, that despite the worry that 
excused jurors see triviality in selection decisions, feel unfairly treated, 
and look down on the courts, when the actual jurors themselves were 
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surveyed, “the perceived reasons for being excused were not
associated with ratings of being treated fairly, overall satisfaction, or 
willingness to serve on a jury in the future.”263 Additionally, although
the peremptory challenge was rarely mentioned as a symbol of 
unfairness, the study found that jurors were critical of aspects of the 
challenge for cause, particularly the hardship exemptions.264 The study 
concluded that the public is relatively accepting towards voir dire and 
its practices, and that the peremptory challenge causes little harm to 
the views of those excused.265
This last study shows that the concept of the jury as a public 
institution does not need to eliminate the peremptory—or the rights of 
the defendant—to protect the public right to serve on a jury.  Though 
scholars are correct to observe that the jury plays a critical role in 
deciding cases that articulate public values,266 Batson and the 
peremptory challenge actually help keep the delicate balance between
the needs of the public versus the needs of the criminal defendant.  
By ensuring that no jurors are struck for constitutionally 
impermissible reasons, the Batson procedure allows the important 
public interest in the selection of the criminal jury.  The fact that both 
the defendant and the potential juror are participants in the same 
judicial process, with a common interest in eliminating discrimination 
in the selection of jurors, is what satisfies the requirement for third 
party standing that “the relationship between the litigant and the third 
party may be such that the former is fully, or very nearly, as effective a 
proponent of the right as the latter.”267  Harm is done to the defendant, 
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the individual juror and the community at large when a juror is 
illegally stricken. The ethical imperative of Batson procedure ensures, 
however, that this scenario is much less likely to happen.
In some ways, the “public perception” problem can be seen as 
one of expressive state action.268  When a potential juror is stricken, 
the action is formalized through the hands of the court.  Whether the 
peremptory challenge is at the hands of the prosecution or the defense, 
the trial court is the mechanism for that strike.  The state, by means of 
the exercise of real and apparent judicial authority in excusing the 
challenged juror, directly effects all acts, discriminatory or not, 
through the trial court.269
As another scholar argues, however, “the appearance of
wrongdoing provides a reason to avoid action in situation in which the 
actor stands in an important relationship with those who are likely to 
mistake her actions.”270    As applied to the public perception concern, 
this means that the fear of appearance of wrongdoing—the judge 
inculcating bias by dismissing potential jurors presumably on the basis 
of race or gender—provides a reason to avoid this action.  A judge’s 
willingness to raise a sua sponte Batson objection is thus heightened 
by this aspect of expressive state action.  “It provides a reason for the 
actor to modify her behavior to accommodate the epistemic limitations 
of those to whom she is responsible”271—that is, the public, or 
potential jurors. 
This all leads back to the normative framework of Batson.  The 
norms inculcated by Batson doctrine not only promote the aspiration 
of non-discriminatory behavior, but also take into account the public 
perception problem.  Because Batson’s ethical imperative compels 
responsible behavior by attorneys and jurists on behalf of not only the 
defendant, but also the potential jurors, there is little conflict between 
the two sets of rights.  Batson ethics straddle the divide by compelling 
lawyers and judges to consider both the defendant and the community 
in acting in non-discriminatory ways.
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F. Why proposed substitutions for the peremptory challenge fail
A variety of substitutions have been suggested by critics of the 
peremptory challenge.  Although most center on some version of an 
expanded for-cause challenge, others are more creative, proposing 
peremptory challenges by blind questionnaire or even dispensing with 
the requirement of unanimity for criminal trials.  As I discuss below, 
each of these putative solutions causes more trouble than the current 
use of the peremptory challenge.
In addition, these approaches overreact to the existence of an 
ethical imperative, creating procedures that are less likely to lead to 
effective deliberation.  Group polarization—where members of a 
deliberating group predictably move towards a more extreme point in 
their spectrum—makes the deliberative process more difficult.272
Group polarization on juries is well documented.273 As a prominent 
scholar notes, “[t]o the extent that the private judgments of individuals 
are moved by discussion, the movement will be toward a more 
extreme point in the direction set by the original distribution of 
views.”274
Diversity of race and gender, which results from the non-
discrimination norms promulgated by Batson, helps eliminate 
homogeneity.275  Eliminating homogeneity, via diversity, on juries
improves the deliberative process, because heterogeneous groups, 
“building identification through focus on a common task rather than 
through other social ties,”276 tend to produce the best outcomes.277
Thus a Batson regime with peremptory challenges recognizes that 
diversity may promote deliberation while at the same time eliminating 
from the jury individuals who may have extreme views, thus either 
distorting the deliberative process or producing hung juries.
Finally, none of these reform proposals have an adequate 
substitute for the peremptory challenge, properly limited to exclude 
racial considerations, let alone possess any form of ethical framework 
to guide lawyers.  Accordingly, although they are interesting thought-
272 See Cass Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble?  Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 
YALE L.J. 71, 73 (2000).    As Sunstein observes, “deliberation predictably pushes 
groups toward a more extreme point in the direction of their original tendency.”  Id.
at 75.
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274
  Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble, supra note __, at 87.
275 See Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble, supra note __, at 75-76.
276
 Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble, supra note __, at 109.
277 See Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble, supra note __, at 109.
55
exercises, these alternatives fail on both a practical and more 
theoretical level.
 1. The expanded for-cause challenge
Some in the Batson abolishment camp argue for an expanded 
cause challenge to replace the peremptory challenge.278  The theory 
here is that the for-cause challenge would be “enhanced to include any 
sound, strategic, non-discriminatory reason why trial counsel might 
doubt a juror’s impartiality or capacity to perform.”279
One critic proposes a revised for-cause challenge system,
which she argues would allow a mechanism for excusing non-
impartial jurors, but would be non-discriminatory since it would 
eliminate peremptories.280 This scholar would revise the for-cause 
challenge by making the standards for striking a potential juror for 
cause somewhat easier, although still relatively narrow.281 This system
would improve upon the current peremptory system because the judge 
would have to decide the merits of each and every challenge. 282
Another critic endorses the expanded for-cause challenge
because it is more consistent with the “rational decisionmaking” that 
we prize in judicial proceedings.283 Although this critic does note that 
it is possible that for-cause challenges might fail to reach all those who 
should be removed from the jury, he contends that “the solution is to 
refine the standards for these challenges, not to allow lawyers to make 
standardless decisions.”284
The expanded for-cause challenge, however, would be a poor 
substitute for the peremptory challenge as it currently exists.  First, 
increasing the number of for-cause challenges would lengthen the time 
and expense of jury selection.  Second, because the for-cause 
challenge has such limited rules, counsel’s ability to shape the jury 
would be severely curtailed.  
Finally, and most importantly for this article, there would be 
essentially no mechanism for addressing one side’s pattern of striking 
278 See Carlson, supra note ___, at 1003.
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potential jurors for illegal bases.  Simply because the strikes would 
then be done through the for-cause challenge as opposed to the 
peremptory challenge does not mean that trial counsel would not 
attempt to control the shaping of the jury as much as possible;  instead, 
there would probably still be occasional instances of discriminatory 
intent in for-cause challenges, either conscious or subconscious.  With 
the revised for-cause challenge system, however, there would be no 
Batson procedure to eliminate these kinds of strikes.
2. Eliminating the requirement of unanimity in criminal 
convictions
Some critics suggest the elimination of the unanimity
requirement in criminal juries as a replacement for the peremptory 
challenge, moving away from an absolute unanimity requirement 
toward a supermajority rule on juries.285 The elimination of the 
peremptory challenge and replacement with non-unanimous juries was 
done in England, is common in Europe286 and has been permitted by 
the Supreme Court.287
Two reasons have been offered for why non-unanimity should 
be considered.  First, critics argue that most of the analogies between 
juries and other institutions cut against unanimity, since majority or 
supermajority rules are used by legislatures, appellate benches, voters 
and grand juries.288 Second, and more importantly, critics posit that the
very idea of unanimity is outdated, as we have now eliminated 
undemocratic barriers to jury service and permitted all adult citizens to 
serve on juries.289 Therefore, “preserving unanimity might also be 
undemocratic, for it would create an extreme minority veto of a kind 
unknown to the Founders.”290
Though this idea of possibly eliminating unanimity is an 
interesting one, ironically, it might result in the marginalization of 
minority jurors, as there would be no procedure to ensure that they
would be properly represented on juries.  Defense counsel would most 
285
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likely oppose such elimination, because it would lower the bar 
necessary to convict criminal defendants. Moreover, the requirement 
of unanimity promotes serious deliberation – since everyone's vote is 
necessary, everyone is equally counted.291  Finally, and most simply, 
the idea of a unanimous verdict in criminal trials is so enshrined as 
part of the public perception of criminal justice that it is almost 
impossible to imagine doing away with it.
More insidiously, however, eliminating the unanimity 
requirement would exclude the impact of minorities on criminal jury 
decisions.  Based on our current demographics, minorities make up, at 
most, maybe 10-15% of the criminal jury.  Eliminating the unanimity 
requirement would mean that the voices of minorities on the jury
would be systematically excluded.  As has been argued in the context 
of electoral districting, the dominant group would get all the power
and the votes of supporters of non-dominant groups or of disaffected 
voters within the dominant group are wasted, and their votes would
lose significance.292
“A system is procedurally fair only to the extent that it gives each 
participant an equal opportunity to influence outcomes.”293 A non-
unanimous jury would fail to give each jury member an equal 
opportunity to influence outcomes because invariably, a few members’
voices would go unheeded.  Thus by eliminating the unanimity 
requirement, only the majority group would achieve representation; 
the non-dominant group, which would invariably include at least one 
minority jury member, would have no voice.   Essentially, a system of 
representation that fails to provide group representation loses 
legitimacy, whether it is electoral districting or criminal juries.294
Minorities on a non-unanimous jury would be consistently excluded 
from decision-making power.  
3. Retaining the form, if not the substance of the peremptory 
challenge
291 But see A. R.  Amar, supra note __, at 1191 (arguing that unanimity cannot 
guarantee mutual tolerance).
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One novel approach that has been advanced for “fixing” the 
peremptory challenge is to permit a form of peremptory challenges via 
blind questionnaire.295 The argument here is that because lawyers will 
not have viewed the jurors, the potential for race and gender bias 
would be reduced. 296 Accordingly, the process would eliminate racial 
and gender discrimination, it would enhance the probability of a more 
impartial jury, and the need for the Batson procedure would be 
eliminated.297
The problem with this admittedly creative idea, however, is that 
bias and discrimination would not necessarily be eliminated by the use 
of a blind questionnaire.  Though lawyers would not be able to see the 
jurors, they would be able to discern much from the questionnaires 
themselves, and it is highly likely that discrimination would still stalk 
the criminal jury selection process.
Ultimately, no substitution for the peremptory challenge will 
eliminate the role of race, gender and ethnicity, and their attendant 
issues, from criminal jury selection.  Instead of attempting to eliminate 
the realities of race and gender by fantasizing about abolishing the 
Batson procedure and the peremptory challenge, it is more useful to 
focus on the affirmative aspects of Batson and the normative
framework of legal ethics that it provides.
V. Conclusion:  Implementing the Legal Ethics of Batson
Batson has many affirmative aspects.  As we have seen, the 
procedure positively affects both lawyers and the public by compelling 
a normative framework of legal ethics which fosters non-
discrimination within jury selection and encourages the moral 
aspirations of the bar. 
Since its very inception, however, the Batson challenge has come 
under a wide range of prudential attacks.   As I explore above, Batson
has been blamed for everything from wasting time to instilling the 
very bias it was meant to eradicate.  As tempting as it may be to pin all 
of contemporary concerns over the jury selection process on Batson, 
though, this impulse should be resisted. Not only is Batson not 
responsible for the plethora of evils articulated by its opponents, it also 
provides a valuable normative framework of legal ethics, one that is 
necessary in the arena of criminal justice, particularly in criminal jury 
selection.
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Criminal jury selection is such a fraught enterprise, carefully 
scrutinized by lawyer and layman alike, because it is the primary way 
the public participates in the criminal justice system.  With the advent 
of open trials, legal reporters and even court television, public 
participation in the criminal jury is a spectator sport, rife with scrutiny 
and commentary.298 Moreover, the public’s participation in the 
criminal jury is not only the primary way of participating in the polity, 
but also establishes many of our notions of fairness and equality.  
Therefore, the recent concerns and fears about who comprises the 
criminal jury and how it functions should be seen as a reflection of the 
ever-growing cultural awareness of the criminal justice system.  
As more and more groups—African Americans, women, 
minorities--have become enfranchised, they have demanded 
participation in the justice system.  The easiest and most enshrined 
way to participate in the criminal justice system has traditionally been 
serving on the petit jury.   A free and open justice system is one of the 
hallmarks of American democracy, and it is a formulation that informs 
the modern American identity. As the composition of the criminal jury 
went from all white to racially mixed, from all male to gender 
diversity, from all Christian to religious multiplicity,  the 
understanding of what comprised the modern criminal jury was deeply 
complicated.  
Additionally, the use of the peremptory as a tool to “stem the 
inevitable tide of civil rights” before Batson has left a deep distrust in 
institutional memory about whether the peremptory challenge can ever 
be used to combat discrimination. Although African-Americans had 
been legally permitted to vote and participate in the jury system since 
Reconstruction, all-white juries were still common.299 Batson’s grand 
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scheme to strip the peremptory challenge of its discriminatory past and 
endow it as a tool to root out bias was inspired, but it has left lawyers 
with a general uneasiness about both the efficacy and the fairness of 
the tool.     
Finally, as one scholar has observed, “deciding who sits on a 
criminal jury is a deadly serious business.”300  The triad of defense 
counsel, prosecutors and judges recognize that shaping a jury has 
important, if not decisive, impact on trials, despite the strength of the 
evidence.301  “It is only a slight exaggeration to say that the battle over 
who sits on juries is a battle over the content of the criminal justice 
dispensed in this country.”302
In essence, the peremptory challenge’s unfortunate history, our 
greater cultural diversity, our desire to explore the inner workings of 
the justice system, our concern over and very formulation of fairness, 
the importance of criminal jury selection and our anxiety over race and 
gender all get placed onto the peremptory.  It is no wonder 
abolishment seems like such a good option; it eliminates both the 
discomfort, the racist and sexist history and—allegedly—the bias in 
one fell swoop.  Twenty years post-Batson, the law still struggles with 
the intellectual after-effects of Batson and progeny.  As much as we 
are happy to pay lip service to anti- discrimination ideals, confronting
them within the criminal justice system has made the bar and bench 
extremely uncomfortable.  
The fact that Batson doctrine is so intimately intertwined with the 
norms of non-discrimination, however, should put some of these fears 
to rest. The structure of Batson requires the enforcement of these non-
discrimination norms during jury selection at each and every criminal 
trial; whether a Batson challenge is raised or not, the lawyer’s 
obligation to act professionally and responsibly is required for all 
lawyers involved.
If one aspiration of legal ethics is, as I have noted before, for 
lawyers to accept personal responsibility for the moral consequences 
of their professional actions,303 then Batson helps achieve this goal.  I 
do not claim that the normative framework imposed by Batson
promises to solve all attorney behavioral problems within the criminal 
trial; far from it.  But Batson’s ethical imperative is a step in the right 
direction.   With enough steps like these, the twin ideals of the bar’s 
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moral accountability, intertwined with the ideal of dispensing a true 
criminal justice, may very well emerge.
